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Abstract
This paper’s primary goal is to investigate whether host country labour market 
competitiveness and labour standards affect the location decision of U.S. firms. The 
analysis is based on a regression model using time series data on FDI, skills, host country’s 
GDP, the corporate income tax rate, distance, and other variables. We also use cooperation 
between labour and employers as a measure of labour standards. Considerable support is 
found for the importance of labour standards in affecting the location decision U.S. firms.
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11. Introduction
In developing countries and transition economies foreign direct investment 
(FDI) is seen as a source of economic development and modernization, income 
growth, and employment. This is because FDI is expected to bring new technologies, 
and thus contribute to increasing productivity and competitiveness of domestic 
industries. FDI is performed by multinational enterprises (MNEs). MNEs create 
positive spillovers in host countries by benefiting local firms and individuals. For 
example, knowledge spillovers occur when local firms learn new technology from the 
MNEs. In order for domestic firms to keep their market shares, they have to increase 
their technology level. Therefore, the new technology can generate spillovers to 
domestic firms (Klaus E. Meyer, 2004). Spillovers also occur via the movement of 
employees. MNEs train local employees. After receiving training these skilled 
individuals might start working for domestic firms or start their own businesses. 
Therefore, FDI increases the general level of human capital (Meyer, 2004). To sum 
up, FDI plays an important role in the economic development of countries.
To speed up economic development, governments are taking actions to 
capture a big share of the foreign investment flows. These actions could be to 
decrease corporate income tax rates and/or tariff rates, to stabilize economic and 
political conditions, and to increase government investment in human knowledge and 
education. For example, since the implementation of the open-door policy to speed 
up China’s industrialization, economic growth has speeded up. The key elements of 
the open-door policy included the decentralization of the foreign trade sector, the
2relaxation of exchange control and real depreciation, and the provision of FDI 
incentives (Ting Go, 2002).
Figure 1 contains the world FDI inflows between 1987 and 2003. Prior to 
1990, most world FDI inflows went to developed countries. World FDI inflows 
declined in 1991 due to the decline of FDI inflows into developed countries. In 1993, 
although FDI inflows into developed countries began to increase again, the amount of 
FDI inflows into developed countries in 1994 was still 30 percent lower than in 1990. 
Despite the decline of world total FDI inflows and the inflows into developed 
countries in the early 1990s, FDI inflows into developing countries continued to 
grow, particularly during 1992-94. In 1994, the amount of FDI inflows into 
developing countries reached US$84 billion, increasing 150 percent compared with 
1990 and the share of developing countries in the world total FDI inflows increased 
from 16.4 percent in 1990 to 37.4 percent in 1994 (Chen Chunlai, 1997).
Figure 1 near here
Among these developing countries, China attracted most o f the inward FDI 
(See Figure 1). The reason is that China followed a successful investment policy. 
Central and local governments invested in infrastructure development such as 
transportation, telecommunications, water conservation, and irrigation facilities and 
main industries such as oil, coal, iron, and steel industries. Governments also 
encouraged foreign investors to invest in infrastructure development and in these 
industries through measures such as tax reduction, priority for specific trades, and 
lower land fees (Yongling Yao, 2003).
3According to the OECD (2000), since 1994 FDI have been placed into the 
most dynamic and largest developed countries with the exception of China which is a 
developing country. The inward FDI to China was US$3.5 billion in 1990. In 2001, 
it was US$57 billion meaning that total FDI increased 17 times. The inward FDI to 
the U.S. was US$48 billion in 1990. In 2001, it was US 159 billion meaning that total 
FDI increased only five times. This indicates that China attracted more FDI than the 
U.S. (World Investment Report, 2004).
In 2002, China ranked fifth among the biggest exporters in the world ahead of 
Britain and the U.S. due to the growing rate of foreign capital investment in the 
exporting sectors and also cheap human capital (Ozgur Caliskan, 2003). China 
captured 9 percent of the total FDI in the world whereas U.S. captured 8 percent of 
the total FDI in the world in 2002. In 2003, China attracted the most FDI and became 
the world’s largest FDI recipient, overtaking the United States, traditionally the 
largest recipient (World Investment Report, 2004, pp. 16). Some have argued that the 
leading factors for this is that China has weak labour standards such as exploitative 
use of child workers, use of forced labour (slavery, bonded labor, and prison labor), 
discrimination in the workplace, not allowing free association of workers, and not 
permitting workers to undertake collective bargaining.
The collective bargaining structure, unemployment insurance level and labour 
and employers relations in a country can be used as proxies for labour standards. 
When bargaining between labour and employers is conducted at the national level 
rather than at the firm level, it indicates high labour standards all else equal. 
According to Mario F. Bognanno et al. (2005), U.S. MNEs do not prefer to invest in
4countries where bargaining between labour and employers are at the national level. 
Moreover, if a country protects labour with unemployment insurance, this indicates 
high level of labour standards all else equal. In this study we only use cooperation 
between labour and employers as a proxy for labour standards due to the availability 
of data. U.S. MNEs tend to locate production in countries with high cooperation 
between labour and employers. When the relationship between labour and employer 
is good then U.S. MNEs run their businesses more smoothly since strike intensity is 
low. Therefore, MNEs have fewer stops in production so in general cost of doing 
business is low.
Firms engage in FDI for different reasons. Some firms engage in FDI to 
access local markets and capture a market share while some firms engage in FDI to 
benefit from relative factor differences. In the literature, some studies use wages 
while some studies use relative skill differences as proxy for labour competitiveness. 
However, they agree that both move together. Bruce Blonigen et al. (2002) and 
James R. Markusen and Keith Maskus (1999) state that MNEs engage in FDI to 
access local markets: both studies find evidence that skill differences between U.S. 
and host countries reduce affiliate sales of U.S. MNEs using data for 36 countries and 
the period from 1986 to 1994. Some studies, on the other hand, find evidence that 
MNEs involve in FDI activities to benefit from relative factor differences between 
countries. Henrik Braconier et al. (2002) use U.S. and Swedish FDI data for the years 
1986, 1990, 1994, and 1998. They find strong support that more FDI is conducted in 
countries where unskilled labour is relatively cheap. Bognanno et al. (2005) examine 
the operations of U.S. MNEs in seven manufacturing industry and twenty-two
5countries over the years 1982-91. They state that although wages are significant 
determinants of location choice, their impact on the location choice of multinationals 
is less than the market size of host country.
This paper’s primary goal is to investigate whether labour market 
competitiveness affects the location decision of U.S. firms. Countries provide 
competitive labour markets through providing high skilled labour. The analysis is 
based on a regression model using time series data on U.S. outward FDI, wages, 
relative factor differences or skill differences, host country GDP, investment cost in 
the host countries, trade costs, and other variables. This paper’s main contribution is 
to use both relative factor differences and wage differences between U.S. and host 
countries in the model. First, we use wage differences then we replace it by skill 
differences since we want to see if they affect FDI in the same way or not. Previous 
studies use either wage differences or relative factor differences in their model (See 
David Carr et al. 2001, Blonigen et al. 2002, Markusen and Maskus 1999, and 
Howard J. Shatz 2004). The other contribution of this paper is to use labour and 
employers relations as proxy for labour standards. From the literature we reviewed, 
there are no studies focusing on the effect of labour standards on FDI so as far as we 
know our study is the first that use cooperation between labour and employers as a 
measure of labour standards. A good level of education in a country and cooperation 
between labour and employers indicate high labour standards since education 
decreases the level o f use of child labour and cooperation increases the welfare of 
labour. In addition, we also investigate whether MNEs engage in FDI activities to
6access a local market (this is known as horizontal FDI) or to benefit from the 
differences in relative factor cost (this is known as vertical FDI).
We mentioned how labour standards affect FDI. In a country where labour 
standards are low, wages are low too, all else equal. Since weak labour standards 
affect FDI and thus trade, some have argued that then they should be included within 
the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) framework. However, many developing and 
some developed countries believe that labour standards should not be considered 
within the WTO’s framework because it is very similar to protectionism policies. 
Efforts to bring labour standards issues into the WTO are made to harm the 
comparative advantage of lower wage countries by the industrial nations. From 
industrial nation’s point of view, it is unfair to gain comparative advantage due to the 
lack of labour standards. According to Maskus (1997), the WTO should not 
incorporate a clause covering rules such as high tariffs on goods using child labour 
because this is ineffective in the sense that it does not totally solve the problem of 
preventing the use of child labour. Instead of implementing such rules, governments 
have to take actions in order to prevent the use of child labour. This is because when 
a developing country exports goods that are made by adult labour, but one of the 
inputs is actually made in an unregulated industry using child workers, tariffs on that 
good reduce demand for both adult workers and child labour in the industry. Both 
adult and child employees are worse off. Using tariffs to penalize countries for 
enforcement of labour standards is inadvisable since they harm those individuals they 
are supposed to help. According to Maskus (1997), developed countries should 
provide developing countries financial aid and force them to use the financial aids to
7decrease poverty and improve education. Maskus (1997) also recommends 
instructing policy analysts or consultants to advise labour officials in developing 
countries about such problems and the gains from removing them. He also 
recommends improving the quality of and access to primary education for poor 
children.
According to Maskus (1997), the WTO is not the appropriate international 
organization to address trade-related problems in labor standards due to the reasons 
discussed above. In believes that the regulation of labor markets should remain 
primarily in the domain of domestic policy and should not be a topic in international 
trade negotiations because if governments attempt to negotiate trade and domestic 
policy simultaneously, complications occur. On the other hand, labor rights activists 
argue that countries can be able to agree on some set of universally accepted human 
rights regarding working conditions (Drusilla K. Brown, 2001). Even the WTO 
points out that labour standards is an issue for the International Labour Organization. 
At the Singapore WTO conference of December 1996 it was decided that the issue of 
labour standards remained a matter for the ILO because even if labour standards 
affect FDI and trade they are mainly in the focus area of the ILO (Cees Van Beers, 
1998).
The definition and function of ILO is the following:
“The International Labour Organization is the UN specialized 
agency which seeks the promotion of social justice and 
internationally recognized human and labour rights. The ILO 
formulates international labour standards in the form of
8Conventions and Recommendations setting minimum standards of 
basic labour rights: freedom of association, the right to organize, 
collective bargaining, abolition of forced labour, equality of 
opportunity and treatment, and other standards regulating 
conditions across the entire spectrum of work related issues”. 
(www.ilo.org).
The ILO is a distinctive organization because it is made up of not only 176 
governments but also the employers and trade unions from those member countries. 
The ILO clearly states its core values are based on the freedom of expression and 
association at work, basically the exercise of human rights in the workplace. Since 
the ILO is responsible for an entire spectrum of work related issues, cooperation 
between labour and employers is an aspect that is within the framework the ILO. The 
1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work emphasizes the 
need for both governments and employers to recognize and accept those standards 
(Robert Taylor, 2002). In order for the ILO to stay as a distinctive organization, the 
core values of the organization have to get attention from global policymakers. The 
problem with the ILO is among the member countries. For example, British Labour 
government is not willing to pursue a global strategy to eliminate poverty and create a 
sustainable development based on open trade and investment. Surprisingly, British 
Labour government seems to concern about labour standards in developing countries, 
but it fails to notice that the ILO is an important institution that pursues objectives in 
labour standards (Robert Taylor, 2002). Therefore, the ILO has to enforce member 
countries to obey labour rules that they have all signed before start arguing the level
9of labour standards in developing countries. The member countries have to agree 
how to improve the labour standards in developing countries then the ILO should be 
strengthened in its monitoring and reporting of violations of labour standards in 
developing countries.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: A historical review of 
world and U.S. outward and inward FDI is provided in the next section. In the third 
section, we give a review of FDI theories and empirical studies. The empirical model 
and the discussion of the regression results are in the fourth section. Section five 
concludes.
2. Background
In 1997, developing countries attracted almost half (43 percent) of world 
inward FDI. However, with the adverse effects of the Asian crisis, Russian crisis, and 
other global crises, in 2000, 43 percent decreased to 18 percent which is the lowest 
level in the last 10 years (See Figure 2). In 2000, developed countries remained the 
prime destination of FDI, accounting for more than three-quarters of global inflows. 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) which is the key driver of global FDI 
since the 1980s, remain the main form of FDI and these are still concentrated in the 
developed countries. In 2000, the United States remained the world’s largest FDI 
recipient country as inflows reached US$301 billion (World Investment Report, 
2001).
10
After 2001, two thirds of the total FDI inflows have gone to developed 
countries. Developed countries have attracted most of the FDI inflows with the 
exception of China, Mexico, and Hong Kong. Countries which attracted the most 
inward FDI are also the countries which have the highest level of outward FDI 
(Caliskan, 2003).
Figure 2 near here
Global inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) declined in 2003 for the 
third year in a row to US$560 billion. This was prompted again by a fall in FDI flows 
to developed countries: at US$367 billion, they were 25 percent lower than in 2002. 
Although the FDI inflows to U.S. fell by 53 percent, to US$30 billion, the lowest 
level in the past 12 years, the US is still the world’s most favored FDI destination. 
An important factor in the decline of inward FDI, and particularly of M&As, has been 
a slowdown or end in privatization- related FDI (World Investment Report, 2004).
Both FDI inflows and outflows was US$2.4 million in 2000, but in 2001 this 
amount decreased by 35 percent so from US$2.4 billion to US$1.5 billion (See Figure 
2 and 3). This decrease in FDI flows was the largest decline since 1990. Some of the 
reasons behind this are the economic downturns in the developed countries, declines 
in the mergers and acquisitions, and partially the effect of September 11.
In 2001, FDI outflows from developed countries were 94 percent of total 
share. FDI inflows to U.S., EU, and Japan were 62 percent, and outward FDI from 
these countries was 85 percent.
Figure 3 near here
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In 2001 and 2002, the U.S. had the biggest share of FDI inflows. In 2001, the 
FDI inflows to the U.S. was US$159 million which is greater that the amount that all 
countries received (See Table 2 and 3). The reason for the rise in FDI inflows into 
the U.S. were the big mergers and acquisitions (i.e. BP-Amocco, Daimler-Chrysler) 
and the development of the information technology sector (Caliskan, 2003).
We use our data to see the destination of U.S. outward FDI. We use data for 
32 countries and the years 1999, 2000, and 2001. In our sample, we have 19 
developed countries and 13 developing countries (See Table 4). U.S. MNEs prefer to 
invest in developed countries. Developed countries have 90 percent share in those 
years. In 2001, U.S. outward FDI to Canada was the largest among developed 
countries with a 20 percent share. Canada was followed by Germany. Germany had 
a share of 13 percent. In 2001, U.S. outward FDI to Mexico was the largest among 
the developing countries with a 38 percent. Mexico was followed by Brazil with a 
share of 16 percent.
Figure 4 near here
3. Literature Review
There are different ways for firms to enter foreign markets rather than FDI 
such as international trade (exporting and importing) and inter-firm relationships such
12
as licensing1, franchising2, and joint ventures (Rivera-Batiz, Luis A. and Maria A. 
Oliva, 2003).
3.1. Why do firms engage in FDI instead of different modes of entry?
According to John H. Dunning (1977) there are some reasons that firms 
engage in FDI instead of the different modes of entry stated above. He introduces the 
OLI framework which is defined as ownership, location, and internalization. 
Dunning (1977) suggests that when a firm has these three conditions it means that it 
has a strong motive to undertake FDI. First, ownership advantages could be good 
reputation, intellectual property, marketing advantages, and/or organizational skills. 
Therefore, ownership advantages are knowledge-based assets (Rivera-Batiz and 
Oliva, 2003). However, ownership advantages do not explain why foreign firms 
locate production facilities in foreign countries rather than exports (Beata 
Smarzynska, 2004). Therefore, this issue is addressed by localization advantages. The 
sources of location advantages differ depending on whether the MNEs investments 
are vertical or horizontal FDI. When the MNEs’ investments are horizontal FDI, 
location advantages include proximity to the target market. Whereas when the 
MNEs’s investments are vertical FDI, location advantages include low input costs 
and low trade costs. In both cases, location advantages should be sufficient enough 
for firms to invest abroad so firms favor FDI than exporting (Rivera-Batiz and Oliva, 
2003; Markusen, 1995). Third, internalization advantage explains why foreign firms
1 Licensing is an agreement in which the owner of some product or service gives permission to use the 
resource to another firm (licensee). Patens, technologies, and trademarks are often licensed (Rivera- 
Batiz and Oliva, 2003).
2 In franchising agreements, the franchisor allow a firm (franchisee) to market the goods or give 
services at a specific location, with the support services from franchisor such as advertisement and/or 
equipment (Rivera-Batiz and Oliva, 2003).
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prefer to have full control over the production facilities rather than licensing their 
intangible assets to foreign firms (Smarzynska, 2004). MNEs avoid complex 
licensing contracts via internalization. Licensing contracts are complex and also have 
some difficulties. For example, a firm might not want to give the full details of a new 
technology to a potential licensee, because the licensee can reject a deal and copy the 
technology at little cost or since the licensee has good knowledge of the market of a 
specific country, he might be reluctant to share the market knowledge with the MNE 
when the market demand is high because when the market demand is high, a MNE 
may prefer to locate a plant in that country (Wilfred J. Ethier, 1986; Markusen, 1995). 
To sum up, FDI may be preferred to complex and costly licensing agreement.
3.2 Forms and types of FDI
FDI can take two forms: (1) purchase of existing companies (merger& 
acquisitions). MNEs via mergers and acquisition of existing host country firms do 
not need to do new physical investment, but they might need to upgrade physical 
investment. (2) Creation of new capacity (“greenfield” investment). MNEs which 
establish new production facilities have to do physical investment by expanding 
research and development activities and managerial resources in the host countries 
(Rivera-Batiz and Oliva, 2003).
The theories of multinational firms regarding FDI can be divided into three 
types: horizontal FDI, vertical FDI, and knowledge-capital model. MNEs which are 
engaged in horizontal FDI have production facilities in many countries whereas 
MNEs which are engaged in vertical FDI split up the different production phases 
among countries. Horizontal FDI is made to access local markets whereas vertical
14
FDI is made to benefit from the differences in relative factor cost. Vertical FDI 
theories imply that wage differentials between U.S. and host countries are important 
and higher tariffs discourage FDI. In contrast, horizontal FDI theories imply that 
market size is an important determinant of FDI and high tariff and distance encourage 
FDI. In both vertical and horizontal FDI theories, there are some usual determinants 
of FDI such as English-speaking ability, cultural differences, and corporate income 
tax rates. The knowledge-capital model incorporates both horizontal FDI model and 
vertical FDI model. In this model, firms locate the headquarter activities such as 
R&D, management, and distribution (Elhanan Helpman, 1984), which requires high 
skilled labour, in rich countries while production services which requires low skilled 
labour are located in poor countries.
According to Markusen and Maskus (1999), there are two significant attempts 
(Helpman, 1984; Markusen 1984) to develop a formal general equilibrium model of 
multinational firms during the early 1980s. In these models, firms exploit economies 
of scale in an imperfectly competitive environment and these models have also been 
named the industrial organization approach to new theories of international trade 
(Carr et al. 2001). There are different theories (such as horizontal theory and vertical 
FDI theory) with different assumptions. The common assumption behind these 
theories is that there is monopolistic competition or oligopoly (imperfectly 
competitive markets) and product differentiation. We focus on two important papers 
which are done by Helpman (1984) and Markusen (1984). Besides these two 
important papers, Carr et al.’s (1996) study is important because they introduce the
15
knowledge-capital model which incorporates both horizontal theory and vertical 
theory.
Helpman (1984) develops a simple general equilibrium model of international 
trade in which production involved two activities, high skill labour intensive and low 
skill labour intensive, which could be geographically separated. In the model, the 
location of plants in a specific industry is a decision variable. His model is based on a 
two-country, two-good, two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade. It 
is assumed that there are two factors of production: labour (L) and a general-purpose 
input (H). The homogeneous product’s unit cost function is cy (wL, wH), where Wi is 
the reward to factor i. A producer o f the homogenous good has to employ all inputs 
at the same location. However, a firm, which produces differentiated goods, can be 
located in many different countries. The input H comprises R&D, management, and 
distribution that can move across countries in a differentiated product industry by the 
help of technology.
A homogeneous product is labour intensive relative to a differentiated 
product. The high-skill labour intensive activity such as R&D is performed in a rich 
country whereas the low skill labour activity such as production is performed in a 
poor country.
In his model, MNEs engage in monopolistic competition, play an active role 
in foreign trade, and he assumes no transport costs. With no transport costs, tariffs, 
and tax advantages, when there is inequality in factor endowments between countries, 
firms choose locations across the world where they can minimize cost. In this case 
there is no reason for firms to be involved in horizontal FDI activities, so firms
16
engage only in vertical FDI activities. When transport costs, tariffs, and tax 
advantages are added to the model, they raise the cost of trade. For example, MNEs 
locate their plants in countries with low wage costs but also as close as possible to the 
parent country to minimize transportation costs. Therefore, the most important 
determinant of FDI is the differences in relative factor costs indicating vertical FDI.
Helpman (1984) concludes that the existence of vertical FDI activities brings 
about intrafirm trade. Integrated MNEs have facilities in both home and host country 
and they engage in intrafirm trade. Intrafirm trade plays a critical role in the 
operations of MNEs which includes both the imports of parent firm from its affiliates 
in host countries and also exports of the parent firm to its affiliates. The most 
important aspect of intrafirm trade is that the export of H services to affiliates in the 
host countries. By exporting H services, affiliates do not need to hire H services in 
the host countries which are also a lot expensive in comparison to labour. Therefore, 
parent firms save affiliates from the hassle of hiring expensive H services.
In contrast to Helpman (1984), Markusen (1984) develops a model in which 
firms do the same activity in multiple locations which is known as horizontal FDI in 
the literature. His study’s aim is not to study the determinants of FDI but to explore 
the welfare effects of FDI in the host country. Markusen (1984) states that there are
two approaches for developing a theory of MNEs. One is related to the intangibles
-2
assets of firms such as R&D, advertising, and marketing . The other one is related to 
a specific technology that is owned by MNEs. In his paper, he uses the second 
approach so his model should meet some conditions. First, the model should bring a
3 See section 3.1 for a detailed discussion.
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good explanation to why firms engage in FDI rather than portfolio investment; 
second, the model should not consider relative factor costs differences between 
countries because the addition of relative factor differences makes the model hard to 
see clear results; third, MNEs should have plants in several countries rather than a 
single plant in one country by definition; and fourth, the model should allow for 
positive profits because profits may play an important role in the gains from trade.
In his model, there are two goods (X, Y), two countries (m, h) with similar 
size, similar factor endowments and similar technology, Y is produced with constant 
returns to scale by a competitive industry, and X is produced by corporate activity (C) 
and factory activity (F). Capital is used in F but not in C. F is characterized by 
increasing returns (so, he assumes that firms do not prefer to have a single location 
instead prefer several locations). Therefore, X=C*F is characterized by increasing 
returns. C activity has the characteristics of public goods. When a firm has firm- 
specific assets such a specific technology developed by the firm, it can be used at 
other locations (similar to public goods) with very little cost and without harming the 
firm- specific assets (there is no reduction in the firm-specific assets) (Caves, 1982). 
He assumes that factors of production are immobile and there are no trade barriers 
because the addition of tariffs create more incentive for firms to invest abroad, but 
does not change the model.
He discusses the welfare effects of MNEs in host countries at the micro level. 
He states that host country firms which are also monopoly producers may not gain 
from MNEs FDI activity because MNEs which produce with technical efficiency (at 
the expense of higher market power) can have all the profits and more importantly
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return these profits to their (home) countries. There are two scenarios that might 
happen when MNEs enter a host country’s market.
First, when MNEs enter the host country market, they can set prices. 
Therefore, MNEs could prevent the entry of Bertrand firms by producing large 
quantities; since market prices are low, Bertrand firms do not find it profitable to 
enter the market.
Second, host country firms do not always behave in a Bertrand fashion 
because when MNEs enter the host market, they can set quantities. Therefore, host 
country firms behave in a Cournot fashion. The host market firms know that when 
MNEs enter the market, quantity supplied increase. With increasing returns to scale, 
it is not profitable to enter the market even though profits that would be earned by 
producing the national enterprise output at the MNE prices are positive. To sum up, 
even though quantity supplied increase; in both cases it is still not clear that MNEs 
increase the host county’s welfare.
Markusen (1984) presents a condition for host country’s firms to gain welfare 
because whether the host country’s welfare gets higher is more uncertain due to the 
fact that MNEs try to capture the monopoly rents (that host country firms can 
potentially obtain). When host countries impose a tax on the profits of MNEs which 
return to home countries, the tax revenue will be equal to the profits that would be 
earned by producing the national enterprise output at the MNE prices. Therefore, the 
gains o f host countries from MNEs are guaranteed.
In summary, the aim of his study is not to find the determinants of FDI but to 
investigate the welfare effects of FDI. He ignores vertical FDI in the very beginning
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of his study by stating that FDI is performed in countries with similar sizes and 
similar relative factor costs differences. He analyzes the welfare effects of MNEs 
considering the host markets and the world. He develops two models and compares 
them. However, in both models it is not clear whether MNEs increase host country’s 
welfare. Therefore, he offers two conditions that host country benefits: first, when 
MNEs increase the quantity supplied locally; and, second, when tax is imposed on the 
MNEs profits which return to home countries.
There are some similarities and differences between the Helpman’s study 
(1984) and Markusen’s study (1984). One of the similarities is that both of the 
studies assume that markets are not perfectly competitive and there is product 
differentiation. Another similarity is that firms do intend to have multiple plants in 
several countries and also some firms have firm-specific assets such as R&D, 
organizational activities and some marketing strategies.
One of the differences is that both of them do not include trade barriers in 
their models. Helpman (1984) examines models with and without trade barriers. He 
states that when there are no trade barriers, there is no reason for firms to engage in 
horizontal FDI because firms can locate production facilities where they can 
minimize costs. Markusen (1984) states that trade barriers do not play an important 
role in his model, so he excluded trade barriers from the model. Second, Helpman 
(1984) emphasizes that the high-skill labour intensive activity such as R&D is 
performed in a rich country whereas the low-skill labour activity such as production 
is performed in a poor country. However, Markusen (1984) emphasizes that MNEs 
locate their activities in identical countries (similar GDPs) with identical technologies
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producing different goods. In Helpman’s (1984) study it is obvious that the two 
countries have different levels of technology because one country is poor the other 
one is rich. Third, Helpman (1984) does not mention the welfare effects of MNEs on 
the host country whereas Markusen (1984) does. To sum up, Markusen’s (1984) 
model represents the theory of horizontal FDI, whereas Helpman (1984) represents 
the theory of vertical FDI.
Different than Helpman (1984) and Markusen (1984), Markusen et al. (1996) 
integrate separate contributions on horizontal and vertical FDI theories which is 
known as the knowledge-capital model in the literature.
Three firm types exist in Markusen et al. (1996), there are two homogeneous 
goods (X and Y), two homogeneous factors (unskilled labour, L and skilled labour, 
S), and two countries (home and foreign). The first type of firms produces the same 
good, as in the home country plant h, in a domestic production plant in the host 
country f (horizontal FDI). The second type divides the production process by 
locating high-skilled labour intensive headquarter services such as R&D in the high- 
skilled labour intensive home country h, and low-skilled labour intensive production 
activity in the low-skilled labor abundant host country f  (vertical FDI), and may or 
may not serve foreign markets via export. The third type produces only in the home 
country h, and may or may not serve foreign markets f  via exports.
The first firm type will be dominant when countries are similar in size and 
relative skill endowments and trade costs (include freight and tariffs) are high. The 
presence of some firm-specific assets, such as blueprints, tends to have additional
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plants with low costs. Firms do not prefer vertical FDI since transportation costs are 
high.
The second firm type will be dominant when the home country is small, 
skilled labour intensive (the host country is unskilled labour intensive), and trade 
costs are not large from the host country back to the home country. These firms gain 
a comparative advantage by locating low skilled labour intensive activities in the low 
skilled abundant host country (lower costs).
The third firm type maintains a single plant and may or may not export. 
According to Helpman et al. (2003), the most productive firms in a country choose to 
invest in foreign markets while the less productive firms choose to export. This 
means that third type of firms is not successful due to, for example, not having 
superior technological knowledge and/or some different ways to promote a product.
Markusen et al. (1996) provide a good model for explaining what type of 
firms can dominate what type of markets with different characteristics.
When countries are similar in relative endowments but different in size, 
neither firms that can potentially engage in vertical FDI nor firms that can potentially 
engage in horizontal FDI have advantages over national firms. In this case there is no 
reason for firms to engage in FDI activities because they can neither exploit relative 
factor differences nor benefit from scale of sales. That is, when countries are similar 
in relative factor endowments but different in sizes, domestic firms located in a large 
home country will have an advantage by avoiding costly capacity in the smaller host 
country. Since the market size is small, MNEs should not expect high scale of sales.
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To sum up, firms do not engage in FDI activities when endowments are similar and 
market sizes different.
When factor price differences are close to each other in two countries, the 
entrance of firms that engage in horizontal FDI to the market equalize the factor 
prices between countries Therefore, when there are no investment barriers there is a 
tendency that factor prices will be equalized. However, when there is a big difference 
between the factor costs of two countries, then there is a reason for firms to split up 
their production process: by locating headquarter services in skilled labour country 
and the plant in the country with unskilled labour. To sum up, firms that engage in 
vertical FDI enter to markets where relative endowments are very different although 
there are horizontal firms that operate in that country.
Markusen et al. (1996) state that investment liberalization can increase the 
volume of trade. Considering X is a more skilled intensive product than Y, but some 
part of the production process of X is less skilled labour intensive in comparison to Y. 
Therefore, firms that engage in vertical FDI decompose the production process of X 
by locating plants in the less skilled labour intensive country (host) and headquarter 
services in the skilled labour intensive country (home). These firms export 
components to the host country for assembly services and import the finished 
products. Therefore, investment liberalization increases the volume of trade.
The studies of Helpman (1984), Markusen (1984) and Markusen et al. (1996) 
are theorical. Next we discuss the empirical studies on the determinants of FDI4.
4 These studies are representative o f the FDI literature.
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Carr et al. (2001) extend the “knowledge-capital model” of the multinational 
enterprises developed by Markusen et al. (1996). The knowledge-capital model 
incorporates both horizontal FDI and vertical FDI due to the simultaneous existence 
of trade costs and different factor intensities across activities. They point out that, 
theoretically, it is difficult to combine horizontal FDI and vertical FDI because the 
determinants of both vertical FDI and horizontal FDI should be included which 
makes the model complex.
Carr et al. (2001) solve the model numerically in order to see the relationship 
between affiliate sales and host country characteristics. They do some predictions 
depending on the size of affiliate production rather than the number of firms with 
various types. In the model, they assume that the country with the firm’s 
headquarters is the parent country not considering what percentage is owned by the 
host country’s firm. They represent the simulation results with a series of Edgeworth 
box diagrams (See Figure 4). They observe that affiliate sales are at a minimum 
when the two countries are in similar in relative endowments but different in size, so 
national firms in the large country dominate. This is similar to Markusen et al.’s 
(1996) results. They find some observations in the middle of Figure 4 where 
countries are identical in size and relative endowments, which represent horizontal 
FDI. Canada and Germany are examples of this kind of countries. They also find 
some of U.S. outward FDI observations on the North-West comer o f Figure 4 where 
countries are different in size but identical in relative endowments. Carr et al. (2001) 
give Sweden, Switzerland and The Netherlands as examples of this kind of countries.
Figure 5 near here
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Carr et al. (2001) use a nine-year panel from 1986 to 1994 and 36 countries 
including U.S. (without distinguish developing country from advanced-country 
affiliates) to investigate the various types of FDI. They use annual data on sales of 
foreign affiliates of U.S. parent firms and on sales o f U.S. affiliates of foreign firms. 
Therefore, the data are bilateral with the U.S., which is either the parent country or 
the host country in every observation. They present the regression results using 
ordinary least squares (OLS), weighted least squares (WLS), and tobit regression.
All o f the coefficients have the expected signs, so consistent with the 
knowledge-capital theory. The coefficient sign of the sum of the home and host 
GDP’s is positive and the coefficient sign of the squared difference in real GDP 
between home and host country is negative. These results point out that an increase 
in the market size of both home and host countries increase the sales o f MNEs in the 
host countries and consistent with horizontal FDI theory. The skill difference term is 
defined as the difference between the ratio of skilled labour to total labour force in the 
home county and the host country. It has a positive sign because firms tend to 
headquartered in the skilled-labour abundant country. An increase in the host country 
skilled-labour abundance may increase total sales of foreign affiliates when that host 
country is small relative to U.S. The product of the differences in the economic size 
and skill endowments (GDP difference* Skill difference) is negative because the 
home country is more skilled labour abundant and smaller than the host country. 
Investment cost is negative because high investment costs discourage MNEs due to 
increasing costs to establish plants in host countries (horizontal FDI). This result 
shows that even though the knowledge-capital model allows for both horizontal and
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vertical FDI to appear simultaneously. Host country trade cost is statistically 
significant. Trade cost index is defined as national protectionism, or efforts to 
prevent importation of competitive products. The coefficient sign is positive because 
an increase in the host country trade cost diminish the incentive to locate plants 
abroad for shipment back to the home country (shipping costs increase) so 
discourages vertical FDI and encourages horizontal FDI because MNEs do not prefer 
to do engage in vertical FDI due to high trade cost, so MNEs prefer to engage in 
horizontal FDI to access local markets. This result is also consistent with the 
horizontal FDI. Distance is ambiguous, because distance affects both export costs 
and investment costs. According to Markusen and Markus (1999), knowledge-capital 
theory does not make clear the expected coefficient sign for this variable. When 
distance is high, MNEs may prefer to produce abroad instead of exporting back to 
U.S. Thus, FDI increases with distance. However, same as Carr et al. (2001), they 
state that distance raises the transaction cost of investment as well as those of exports. 
Thus, FDI decreases with distance as well.
Their main contribution is to construct a model that allows for simultaneous 
horizontal and vertical motives for direct investment. They found that an increase in 
host country skilled labour increases affiliate production in the host country. This is 
consistent with horizontal FDI. However, large values o f skill difference and GDP 
difference decrease the affiliate sales. This is consistent with vertical investment. 
Even though this is the main conclusion, the sign of host country trade cost supports 
horizontal FDI model.
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Going back to the simulation results (See Figure 4), Braconier et al. (2002) 
pool both U.S. outward and inward FDI using the years 1986, 1990, 1994, and 1998. 
They find the bulk of U.S. outward FDI observations in the North-East comer which 
indicates that countries are different in both factor endowments and sizes and the bulk 
of inward observations in the South-West comer where countries are different in size 
and relative endowments. They do not find any observations in the North-West 
comer where countries are different in size but identical in relative endowments as 
Helpman (1984) and Carr et al. (2001). Carr et al. (2001) pool U.S. outward data 
with inward data using a nine-year panel from 1986 to 1994. Consequently, 
according to Braconier et al. (2002), the problem is the data set o f Carr et al. (2001) 
and Helpman (1984).
Before we discuss the studies which focus on horizontal FDI and vertical FDI, 
we present the table of Markusen and Anthony J. Venables (1996) that provides a 
good summary of the firm and country characteristics of horizontal multinationals, 
vertical multinationals and national exporting firms (See Table 1). There are two 
hypothesis in the literature related to the multinationals’ location decisions. The first 
one is the factor proportions hypothesis. It predicts that firms should be involved in 
FDI activities to take the advantage of relative factor price differences and also to 
have proximity to customers. This is also known as vertical FDI. The second one is 
proximity-concentration hypothesis. It predicts that firms should be involved in FDI 
activities when the market access advantages outweigh the advantages from plant- 
level scale economies. This is also known as horizontal FDI.
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From Table 1, we observe that when firm level economies scales are large, 
plant scale economies are low, countries are large and similar in size firms will 
engage in horizontal FDI. This is because when MNEs scale of sales are high and 
when trade costs are high it is not profitable to export to home country. This is also 
true when countries are similar in relative factor endowments. This is because 
headquarter services and production use factors in the same proportion. Firms will 
engage in vertical FDI when trade costs are not high otherwise exporting back to 
home country is costly and countries have different relative factor endowments in 
order to decrease the labour costs. National exporting firms can export to countries 
with different sizes as long as trade costs are low.
Table 1 near here
In contrast to Carr et al. (2001), Blonigen et al. (2002) and Markusen and 
Maskus (1999) reject both the vertical FDI model and the knowledge-capital model 
although they use the same time period and the FDI measure as Carr et al. (2001).
Blonigen et al. (2002) correct an econometric specification problem that led to 
the support of the knowledge-capital model of MNEs in Carr et al.’s (2001) paper. 
They demonstrate that this finding arises because of a misspecification in the skill 
difference terms ((skillparent-skillhost) and (skillparent-skillhost)*(GDPparent-GDPhost)) in 
Carr et al’s empirical framework. They explain the reason as follows:
“When the skill difference term lies in the positive range, an 
increase in the variable corresponds to a greater inequality in the 
relative skill endowments. However, when the skill difference 
term is negative, parent and host country skill endowments
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converge as the difference term rises. As a result it is incorrect to 
estimate a pooled coefficient on a difference term that takes both 
positive and negative values in the sample” (p.6).
When they take the absolute values5 of the difference terms, they obtain 
opposite coefficients than Carr et al. (2001). Therefore, absolute skill differences 
reduce affiliate sales, which support the horizontal model of MNEs. In order to 
strengthen the evidence they include data from OECD countries and obtained the 
same result. Another problem with Carr et al. (2001) is that they pooled both U.S. 
inward FDI and outward FDI. Therefore, it is difficult to interpret the negative and 
positive coefficient values on the skill difference term because the skill difference 
term have different signs when the outward and inward FDI data are used separately.
Markusen and Maskus (1999) use both inward data (U.S. affiliates of foreign 
parents) and outward data (foreign affiliates o f U.S. parents). The U.S. Department 
of Commerce provides annual data on sales of foreign affiliates of U.S. parent firms 
and sales of U.S. affiliates of foreign parent firms. Therefore, the data are bilateral 
with the U.S. which is either the parent country or the host country in every 
observation. This explains what they mean by inward-outward FDI data together. 
They use data from 1986 to 1994 and there are 36 countries. They use an index of 
trade barriers in the parent country defined as a measure of national protectionism6 
same as Carr et al (2001). Their study is interesting than the previous literature 
especially Carr et al.’s (2001) because they extend the knowledge-capital model by
5 Absolute skill difference (= | sk illparent-skillhost | ) and
absolute skill difference* absolute GDP difference (= | skillparent-skillhost* GDPparent-GDPh0st | )
6 They define trade cost index as measure o f national protectionism, or efforts to prevent importation of 
competitive products.
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decomposing foreign affiliate sales data into sales to the host country, export back to 
U.S., and sales to third countries.
In the regressions with only the U.S. outward data7, the coefficient sign of the 
skill difference term is negative; however, in the regressions with the U.S. inward 
data, its sign is positive. They explain the negative sign as follows: since the U.S. is
o
much larger than any other country, an increase in skill difference (skill us-skill host) 
means that U.S. affiliates in other countries shut down their plants due to insufficient 
skilled labour. Therefore, the local sales in the host countries and also sales to third 
countries by U.S. affiliates decrease. This indicates that U.S. outward investment is 
attracted to countries with high skill labour abundance so they find evidence in favor 
of the horizontal FDI model. The other variables are the same signs as in the U.S. 
inward FDI model that we explained below.
Considering inward FDI9, although they expect the coefficient sign of trade 
barriers back into the parent country to be negative (since trade costs raise the costs of 
imported intermediate inputs), they find that it is positive in the regression with 
export to all countries as the dependent variable. However, its sign should be 
negative because trade costs raise the costs of imported intermediate inputs, at least in 
the regression with exports to home country as the dependent variable. However, 
export to all countries data cannot be broken out as exports to home country and 
exports to third countries. The magnitude of the simple sum of U.S. and home
7 The U.S. outward FDI data are broken down into local sales, export back to the U.S., and sales to 
third countries.
8 Host country skilled labour abundance decreases.
9 The inward data are broken down as local sales and export to all countries different than Carr et al. 
(2001 ) ’s study.
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country GDP is much smaller in the regression with export to all countries as the 
dependent variable than in the regression with local sales as the dependent variable. 
Therefore, similar to Carr et al., they state that exports by affiliates are favored when 
the parent is both skilled labour abundant and small such as Sweden, Switzerland and 
The Netherlands. Also, market size is a more important determinant of production 
for local sales. Only the coefficient of the skill difference term is not statistically 
significant in the regression with local sales as dependent variable. When the United 
States is host, as increase in parent-country skilled-labour abundance increase the 
parent-country’s affiliate production in the U.S. (skill home-skill us)- When the U.S. is 
the parent, an increase in host-country skilled-skilled labour abundance increases U.S. 
affiliate production in the host country (skill us-skill host)- The product of the 
differences in the economic size and skill endowments (GDP difference*Skill 
difference) is negative because with the parent country more skilled labour abundant 
than the host country, at lower value of GDP difference skill difference term changes 
sign from positive to negative.
According to Shatz (2004), FDI to developing countries has risen more than 
the FDI in advanced countries. Different from Blonigen et al. (2002), Braconier et al.
(2002), and Carr et al. (2001) he focuses on countries’ policies and geography not on 
factor costs.
Shatz (2004) emphasizes geography variables such as trade costs and the 
percentage of a country’s population within 100 km of the coast (pop 100) in 
analyzing the determinants of different types of FDI. Trade cost is an important 
determinant of the horizontal FDI model only if foreign affiliates of U.S. firms use
31
U.S. inputs intensively because trade costs raise the costs of imported intermediate 
inputs. He uses data from 1986 to 1995 and divides the independent variables as 
policy (trade openness10, FDI openness11, and EPZs), economic (education, wage, 
exchange rate volatility, and GDP), geography (Pop 100, and trade cost), and other 
variables (English speaking, stability, and distance). He includes EPZs (export 
processing zone), RTA membership (e.g. EU, and Mercosur memberships) as policy 
variables, and POP 100 as a geography variable in his analysis different than Blonigen 
et al. (2002), Braconier et al. (2002), and Carr et al. (2001). Shatz (2004) uses U.S. 
outward FDI and examines 29 developing countries whereas Carr et al. (2001) do not 
distinguish developing-country from advanced-country affiliates. He analyzes 
vertical FDI and horizontal FDI separately. Also, he defines horizontal FDI as 
exports to the rest of the world and vertical FDI as sales in the host country.
He points out that horizontal FDI and vertical FDI have different 
determinants. This is different than previously discussed studies because they state 
that horizontal FDI and vertical FDI have common determinants. For example, first, 
the wage variable and the percentage of population near the coastline variable are 
strongly statistically significant in the regression with horizontal FDI as dependent 
variable with negative and positive signs respectively. These mean that MNEs locate 
production facilities in low wage costs countries (the labour costs are low) and coastal 
access has a very important impact when serving third countries. Coastal access is an
10 He uses the Sachs-Warner trade openness index, equal to 0 (when a country is closed to FDI) or 1 
for a single. The index measures the closeness if  a country has high use o f non-tariff barriers for 
capital or intermediates goods or it was a socialist.
11 He creates FDI openness index, which is from 0 to 5 with 5 most open. The index measures the 
burden to start-up a firm and the simplicity o f foreigners to acquire domestic firms.
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important determinant of economic growth and coastal access facilities exports. 
Second, he finds that FDI openness has positive impact on exports to third countries 
but surprisingly he finds that FDI openness is not a determinant of vertical FDI. In 
the literature, studies mostly find the same signs in both regressions because first 
MNEs locate production facilities in the host country then they serve third markets. 
Thus, the more open a country to FDI, the more investment it gets all else equal. 
Third, the stability variable is statistically significant in the regression with horizontal 
FDI as dependent variable but it is not statistically significant in the vertical FDI 
model. Its sign is positive in the horizontal FDI regression. This means that stability 
reduces the costs and risks of investments because investors feel more secure so they 
invest more in secure countries. Thus, the more stable a country, the more inward 
FDI all else equal. Fourth, the tax variable is not significant in the horizontal FDI 
regression whereas it is significant in the vertical FDI regression. It is surprising that 
he finds the tax variable is not significant. High level of corporate income tax rate 
increases the cost o f doing business in the host country. MNEs invest in the host 
country, even when they serve third countries or not. Thus, tax rate affect MNEs that 
export to third countries too. Fifth, the education variable is significant in the 
horizontal FDI model (not significant in the vertical FDI model) but its sign is 
negative because higher level of education reflects higher labour costs. Therefore, 
this indicates that vertical FDI and horizontal FDI have different determinants. Fifth, 
English speaking ability has positive sign and significant in the vertical FDI model 
but not significant in the horizontal FDI model. Brainard (1997) states that a 
common language should lower the share of export to third countries if  exporting
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requires less communication than running a local production facility. Seventh, 
Mercosur membership is statistically significant and has positive sign in the 
horizontal FDI model so it is also not a common determinant. The coefficients of 
exchange rate volatility, EU membership, and GDP are not statistically significant in 
neither o f the models.
The main finding of Shatz (2004) is that US multinationals consider 
developing country geography because Pop 100 is an important determinant of FDI, 
because coastal access facilities exports when choosing exports platforms because a 
country’s location and its coastal population determine the level of vertical and 
horizontal FDI.
Braconier et al. (2002) find strong support in the favor of vertical FDI, in the 
sense that more FDI is conducted in countries where unskilled labour is relatively 
cheap. They use the years 1986, 1990, 1994, and 1998. Braconier et al. (2002) 
define relative wage premium as the ratio o f the skilled to unskilled wage in the host 
country, in relation to the same ratio in the home country. They use previously 
unused data on gross wages of engineers and production workers to measure the skill 
premium. Their results show that the impact of differences in the relative wage cost 
is larger on affiliate exports to the MNEs’ home country than on affiliate exports to 
other countries. They state that the three types of affiliate activities, local sales, 
exports to the home country, and export to third countries, seem to be driven by the 
same factors such as GDP of host and home country, wage differences, investment 
cost, and distance. All o f the variables have the expected signs. However, the 
coefficient o f protection is significant only in exports to third countries regression.
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Their results show that the impact of differences in the relative wage cost is larger on 
affiliate exports to the MNEs’ home country than on affiliate exports to other 
countries.
They replace the factor endowment data with relative wage costs different 
than previous studies because firms’ incentives to conduct vertical FDI are directly 
related to relative factor costs, but only indirectly to factor endowments. There are 
other studies in the literature that use relative factors costs rather than relative factor 
endowments such as Bognanno et al. (2005) and Nocke and Yeaple (2004). Their 
data show that relative factor endowments and relative factor costs are not highly 
correlated, so firm’s incentives to conduct vertical FDI are directly related to relative 
factor costs, but only indirectly correlated to factor endowments.
Different than the other studies, Brainard (1997) uses plant level scale 
economies and firm level scale economies as independent variables in addition to the 
usual independent variables used by the previous studies. Plant scale economies are 
measured as the number of production employees in the median U.S. plant ranked by 
value added. Corporate scale economies are measured as the number of 
nonproduction workers in the average U.S. based firm. He uses both U.S. outward 
and inward FDI data for the year 1989 disaggregated by industry and country. Same 
as Markusen and Maskus (1999), he decomposes both outward U.S. data and inward
1 7U.S. data . The data include 27 countries without distinguishing developing country
12 The U.S. outward FDI data are broken down as export shares (vertical FDI) and affiliate sales 
(horizontal FDI) o f U.S. multinationals. The U.S. inward FDI data are broken down as import shares 
and affiliate shares.
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from advanced-country affiliates same as Carr et al. (2001). In the model with the
• • • • • 1 ^outward data, all the variables are statistically significant and have the expected
signs. However, the coefficient on the tax variable is positive which is not consistent 
with his expectations. He explains this by the correlation between the tax rate and 
other macroeconomic variables, such as investment and income. He does not bring 
any further explanation about this. Brainard (1997) find that the inward model is 
equivalent to the outward model, so the coefficients’ signs are the same. However, 
the tax variable has the reverse sign in the model using inward data. This is because 
when there is a tax increase in other countries, it becomes more profitable for firms to 
produce in the U.S. rather than home country due to the decreasing cost.
Brainard (1997) states that the proximity-concentration hypothesis should be 
tested on the share of affiliate sales and exports in total sales, rather than on the levels 
in order to compare results with the previous literature, he also includes GDP as an 
independent variable. The coefficient sign of GDP is positive in all equations (inward 
and outward, local sales, export, and import). At the same time, he finds the 
coefficient sign of per-worker income differential is negative in the regression with 
horizontal U.S. outward FDI as dependent variable. This is because horizontal FDI is 
done in high wage countries. The sign is positive in the regression with vertical U.S. 
outward FDI as dependent variable because the more the relative wage differential, 
the higher the vertical FDI due to decreasing labour costs all else equal. This result is 
consistent with the horizontal FDI model even if he does not mention it.
13 See Table 3 for the sign o f the coefficients.
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Bognanno et al. (2005) examine the operations of U.S. MNEs in seven 
manufacturing industry and 22 countries over the years 1982-91. All 22 countries are 
developed countries14 except Mexico. The main question they ask is how wages, 
tariffs, and industrial relations affect the location choice of MNEs. According to 
them this statement, “lower wages attracts more FDI” is anomalous. First, they think 
that FDI is made to access local markets. They expect FDI to be done in big markets. 
Second, low wage means low production efficiency, so high wage countries are more 
efficient. Third, there are some unobserved characteristics of countries such as 
corruption, relative factor endowments, and openness to FDI. These may be 
positively correlated in low wage countries. Fourth, the average wage rate in a 
country may be low, but a MNE uses a particular technology in its production 
process. This MNE needs skilled labour, possibly with high wage. In order to see 
this, they use industry level panel data. In the sense that they use industrial relations 
variable, their study is the first.
Their focus is whether wages and industrial relations factors are important 
determinants of U.S. outward FDI or not. The independent variables include U.S. and 
host country average manufacturing wage rates, corporate tax rates, tariff rates, 
distance, transportation cost, proxies for U.S. and host country market size, and 
industrial relations (IR) environment variables. They define IR environments using 
five variables: union density, strike intensity, collective bargaining structure, works 
councils, and layoff restrictions. The dependent variables include U.S. affiliates5 total
14 These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.
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assets in a host country divided by U.S. MNEs’ worldwide total assets, U.S. affiliates’ 
total employment in a host country divided by U.S. MNEs’ worldwide total 
employment, and U.S. affiliates’ net sales in a host country divided by U.S. MNEs’ 
worldwide net sales.
Since they have panel data, heteroskedasticity appears to be a problem. The 
variance of the error term for the developed countries tends to be much greater. They 
normalize the dependent variables by converting them to shares. For example, they 
use U.S. affiliates’ total assets in a host country divided by U.S. MNEs’ worldwide 
total assets. However, although this method reduces heteroskedasticity, it does not 
eliminate it. Hence, they use a Box-Cox transformation15. There is no 
homoskedasticity problem for both linear and log specifications for all independent 
variables. They obtain results for OLS. The R2 values are quite good in the asset 
share and employment share equations.
They find that market size is an important determinant o f the location decision 
of MNEs which is consistent with the horizontal FDI model. Cultural openness and 
English-speaking ability have positive effect on the share of assets and employment 
located in a host country as expected. However, the corporate income tax rate is 
positively related to the share of MNEs employment located in a host country which
15 A Box-Cox power transformation on the dependent variable is a useful method to lessen 
heteroscedasticity when the distribution o f the dependent variable is not known. In the statistical 
literature it is advised to use a Box-Cox transformation in order to make data more suitable for 
statistical analysis. The Box-Cox transformation can be used for converting the data to a normal 
distribution. For situations in which the dependent variable Y is known to be positive, the following 
transformation can be used:
(Source: Stanford University, available at http://www- 
stat.stanford.edu/~olshen/manuscripts/selenite/node6.html)
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is not expected. The coefficient sign of distance is positive, but the negative 
interaction with the GDP shows that the effect of distance is negative. This means 
that distance reduces the transportation costs. As expected, the coefficient of the 
wage variable has a positive sign meaning that an increase in the host country average 
wage rate causes an increase in the size of U.S. MNEs in the host country. Also, U.S. 
multinationals prefer to locate production in countries with low strike intensity, 
decentralized bargaining, and no layoff restrictions, so among the IR environment’s 
variables collective bargaining structure and layoff restrictions have statistically 
significant effects on U.S. MNEs production location decisions.
The prior literature finds positive or zero correlation between host country 
average wage rate and MNEs allocation of employment to the country since previous 
literature does not control for industry/country specific unobservables. However, 
when Bognanno et al. (2005) control for industry/country affects they observe that 
although wages and industrial relations are significant determinants of location 
choice, their effect on the location choice of multinationals is less than the market 
size of the host country. Therefore, their result is consistent with the horizontal FDI 
model.
Nocke and Yeaple (2004) have a different approach on studying the 
determinants of FDI than the previously reviewed studies. They classify FDI as 
greenfield investment and cross border acquisitions. When factor cost differences are 
small between countries, cross border acquisitions take place, whereas when factor 
costs differences are big between countries, greenfield investments take place. 
Greenfield investments are always one way; from high cost country to low cost
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country. However, cross border acquisitions occur in both directions. Nocke and 
Yeaple (2004) state that FDI is made from the country with comparative disadvantage 
to the country with comparative advantage. Greenfield investments involve 
establishing in a new place which is costly, so the best firm-specific assets are used 
for the production in the low cost country. Cross border acquisitions is basically done 
by taking over existing foreign enterprises. Therefore, firms engaging in greenfield 
investments are more efficient than those engaging in cross border acquisitions. 
Because of this characteristic many host country governments support greenfield 
investments rather than cross border acquisitions.
They use a simple econometric model o f a firm’s choice o f FDI mode. They 
assume that each MNEs chooses the mode either cross-border acquisition (ACQ) or 
greenfield FDI (GF) that yields the highest profits. The dependent variable ACQ 
takes a value of one when the investment in industry k and country c by parent firm p 
in parent industry j takes the form of a cross-border acquisition, and zero otherwise.
The key characteristic on firm heterogeneity is the firm’s efficiency relative to 
its competitors. Efficiency is defined as productivity. They use two proxies that 
should be highly correlated with productivity which are a firm’s sales to customers in 
the United States and the ratio of total firm sales to the number of employees which 
are also the dependent variables in their model. In the model there are both firm level 
and country level controls. Firm level controls are the ratio o f a firm’s net book value 
of its physical plant and equipment to the number of its employees, and a firm’s 
number of employees. The country controls are real GDP per capita, population and 
openness. Real GDP per capita variable captures a host country’s level of
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development and population captures a country’s market size. Openness is a measure 
of country’s openness to international trade which is the sum of exports and imports 
divided by GDP. They focus on the efficiency variable. The negative coefficient of 
efficiency with both dependent variables; indicates that the parent firms with the 
largest U.S. sales and firms with the highest labour productivity tend to enter foreign 
markets through greenfield rather than acquisitions. They find that country size does 
not play an important role since it has small statistically insignificant coefficient. 
Real GDP per capita has large statistically significant positive coefficient. Host 
country’s openness to trade has negative and statistically significant coefficient. 
Their main conclusion is that firms enter foreign markets through greenfield are more 
productive than those enter through cross-border acquisitions. Also, there is a strong 
relationship between the real GDP per capita o f the host country. This means that 
U.S. MNEs favor cross-border acquisition over Greenfield FDI.
Tadesse and Ryan (2004) examine how a host market’s maturity and host 
market’s role as an export platform affect the inward FDI that it receives. According 
to them, in the literature authors focus on the host market characteristics such as 
market size and relative factor differences but they have not discussed two important 
host market characteristics-its market maturity and its role as an export platform. 
They define market maturity as “the degree to which host country institutions and 
policies provide foreign firms a market environment characterized by the presence of 
voluntary exchange, competition, and secure property rights”, (pp. 200) They argue 
that the recent increase in the FDI flow between countries indicates that firms locate 
their production facilities in the host countries in order to serve third countries.
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Therefore, host countries act as an export platform16. For example, Japanese 
companies invest in Mexico, because Japanese firms obtain the opportunity to serve 
the U.S. and Canadian markets under the North American Free Trade agreement 
(NAFTA). Moreover, when they classify Japanese FDI in 125 countries, they see that 
45 percent of Japanese affiliates out o f 40,000 are located in countries that serve as 
export platforms to third countries.
They use Japanese outward FDI into 85 countries for the period 1989-1999. 
They chose Japan as a country since Japanese outward FDI is spread around the 
world in both developed and developing countries. They use a weighted average of 
some variables to construct an index as a proxy for market maturity. These variables 
are as follows: “the extent to which private property rights are protected, the freedom 
citizens enjoy in transacting with foreigners, the extent to which labour and capital 
regulations constrain market functions, the degree to which markets function free 
from government intervention and the host’s monetary policy”, (p. 211) The index is 
scaled from 1 to 10 with 10 indicating more mature markets. Regarding export 
platforms, each host country is represented by a dummy variable out of four which 
defines their export platform status. These dummies are classified as (1) Japanese 
firms investing in host countries to serve host markets; (2) firms invest in host 
markets to serve the host’s regional markets such as Asia; (3) firms that invest in host 
countries serve to host’s non-regional markets such as Europe; and (4) firms that 
invest in host countries in order to serve Japan. Besides, they also include Japanese 
bilateral exports and imports, availability of cheap labour as a proxy for relative
16 This approach to FDI analysis analysis is very different from those reviewed above.
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factor costs, lending rate (it is the bank rate that meets the private sector’s financial 
needs), host country’s road density as a proxy for infrastructure, population as a 
proxy for the host’s domestic market size, the mean and variance o f annual exchange 
rate change as a proxy for the strength and volatility of Japanese-host bilateral 
exchange rate, tariff rate as a proxy for openness, political stability, and 
anticorruption measures as independent variables.
When they estimate the model using maximum likelihood with all variables 
included except for the four dummies which are explained above as a proxy for 
export platforms, their results show that Japanese FDI increase with host market’s 
maturity level. This is because when a country’s market is mature, investors face a 
better business environment. However, when countries’ market maturity levels are 
same, countries might still receive different levels of inward FDI. This might be due 
to the host countries’ export platform status. Therefore, they include the four dummy 
variables as proxy for the export platform. The result indicates that Japanese firms 
prefer to invest in host markets serving as export platforms to their regional markets 
than to invest host markets in order to serve host markets.
Regarding the other independent variables they conclude as follows: (1) trade 
to host markets is more than the FDI flow when markets are mature, (2) countries 
with low labour costs receive more FDI due to the decreasing costs, (3) higher 
lending rates discourage inward FDI because it requires high level o f marginal 
productivity of capital, (4) in countries with larger populations local sales are high; 
countries with stable economies and with high level of openness receive more FDI.
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To sum up, their conclusion regarding the signs of the other independent variables are 
same as some of the studies such as Carr et al. (2001).
Yeaple (2003) studies the industry determinants (such as transport costs, plant 
scale economies, and factor intensities) and country determinants (such as market 
size, tariff level, and factor abundances) of U.S. outward FDI. He expands the 
knowledge-capital model by exploring country-industry pair variation by considering 
variations in host country factor abundances. The knowledge-capital theory suggests 
that the pattern of FDI should vary across country-industry pairs with the strength of 
market access motive and comparative advantage motive for FDI.
The dependent variable is total sales of U.S. MNEs. The independent 
variables are transport cost (ad volarem measure of freight and insurance cost and 
tariff), scale economies, host country’s market size (a country’s GDP), a country’s 
openness to FDI, corporate income tax rate, and a potential host country’s unit cost of 
production by sector. He measures the unit cost of production by sector and country 
with the abundance of human capital which is the average years of schooling and 
skilled labour intensity which is defined as the ratio of non-production workers to 
value added by industry. The unit cost of production by sector and country comprises 
human capital and skill. With the unit cost of production variable his aim is to 
capture a pattern of FDI which reflects comparative advantage. The sign of the unit 
cost of production is expected to be negative meaning that FDI is done in unskilled 
labour intensive countries rather than skilled labour intensive countries.
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Scale economies incorporate both production scale economies (which is the 
employment of production workers at the U.S. firm) and corporate scale economies 
(which is the employment of nonproduction workers at the U.S. firm).
He estimates the model by using OLS. He obtains the coefficient sign of 
human capital and skilled labour intensity to be negative supporting vertical FDI 
because firms tend to invest in countries with unskilled labour intensive countries 
because wages are low, so labour costs are low. Also, the coefficient sign of market 
size is positive supporting horizontal FDI when a market is large, firms tend to invest 
in that market due to higher scale of sales. The coefficient sign of tariff is positive, 
which is consistent with horizontal FDI theory because when the tariff levels are high, 
firms tend to invest in that country in order to access the local markets. However, 
when he excludes host market’s size from the regression, R got smaller by 24 
percent. And, also the coefficient o f the human capital is smaller in absolute value. 
When he excludes comparative advantage variables (human capital and skilled labour 
intensity), R got smaller only 15 percent. Even though his results are consistent with 
knowledge-capital model (because the model allows both horizontal FDI and vertical 
FDI simultaneously), host country’ market size is more important than relative factor 
differences.
Recently the effects o f intellectual property rights (IPR) and environmental 
regulations on FDI have been taken into account by some authors such as Javorcik
(2004), Co et al. (2004), and Ederington and Minier (2003). In the next pages we 
discuss these papers.
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According to Javorcik (2004) it is important to understand the factors that 
affect FDI as well as the determinants of the composition of such flows. She 
investigates this issue by examining the impact of IPR protection on the structure of 
FDI. According to her, there are not many researches about intellectual property 
rights.
Javorcik (2004) investigates two points: first, whether foreign investors in 
sectors that are IPR intensive are affected more than other investors; second, whether 
the IPR regime influences a foreign investors’ choice between establishing production 
facilities and setting up distribution facilities.
She uses firm level data set from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
The reason why she chooses Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as countries 
is because the control on inward FDI flows in these regions started after 1989, so the 
countries’ investment policies do not have a long history which is easy to control. 
She uses firm level data which includes 1405 firms regarding their planned 
investments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union between the years 1989 
to 1994.
Javorcik (2004) uses patent rights protection indices developed by Ginarte and 
Park (1997) as a proxy for IPR protection. “The Ginarte-Park index takes into 
account five categories of patent laws: (1) extent of coverage, (2) membership in 
international patent agreements, (3) provisions for loss of protection, (4) enforcement 
mechanisms, and (5) duration of protection. Each of the categories is assigned a 
value between 0 and 1, and the unweighted sum of these values constitutes the patent
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17  _rights index . Thus, the index ranges from zero to five with the higher values 
indicating a stronger level of protection”, (pp. 46)
Javorcik (2004) added other variables to the model such as the overall 
progress in reform, effectiveness of the legal system, corruption level, privatization 
policies and openness to trade. Overall progress in reform is measured by price 
liberalization and competition, trade and exchange rate system, large and small scale 
privatization, enterprise restructuring, and banking reform. The average of these 
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) indices which stated 
above are used as a proxy for risks associated with FDI. The effectiveness of the 
legal system is measured by another EBRD index. It is an index from 1 to 4 which 
compromises whether legal rules affecting investment are clear and acceptable. The 
highest value, 4, indicates an effective legal system. A corruption index is included 
to the model. The index is from 0 to 10 with 10 indicating less corruption. 
Privatization is defined as the share of GDP accounted for by the private sector. The 
model includes GDP per capita which is a proxy for purchasing power o f local 
consumers. The population size reflects the potential size of market. She controls for 
corporate tax rate as higher taxation is likely to discourage investment.
Javorcik (2004) finds that weak IPR protection deters inward FDI in four 
technology intensive sectors: “drugs, cosmetics, and health care products; chemicals; 
machinery and equipment; and electrical equipment. Weak IPR regime causes 
foreign investors’ to set up distribution facilities rather than to establish production 
facilities. Weak IPR protection increases the probability of imitation which harms
17 See Ginarte and Park, 1997 for a detailed description of the patent rights index.
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foreign firms’ ownership advantages and decreases localization advantages of foreign 
firms. The other variables have the expected signs. Population size is found to have 
a positive impact on FDI inflows in all industries. GDP per capita is positively related 
to FDI inflows and it does not affect the high technology sectors differently. As 
expected privatization process increase the probability of FDI. On the other hand, 
higher level f  corruption and higher corporate tax rates have negative effect on inward 
FDI.
Catherine Y. Co et al. (2004) examine the relationships between intellectual 
property rights and environmental regulations and FDI. They use the time period 
from 1982 to 1992 and U.S. outward FDI into several developing and developed 
countries. They use two manufacturing industries: food and kindred products which 
do not need pollution equipment heavily and also is less sensitive to IPR protection 
since the industry is not technology intensive; and chemical and allied products which 
need heavy pollution equipment and also more sensitive to IPR protection since the 
industry is technology intensive. Same as Javorcik (2004), Co et al. (2004) use patent 
rights protection indices developed by Ginarte and Park (1997) as a proxy for IPR 
protection and also lead content per gallon of gasoline is used as a proxy for the 
stringency environmental regulations. Their empirical results show that first, the 
level of patent protection is important in developing countries but not in developed 
countries (since the coefficient estimate is not statistically significant) for the latter 
because the level o f patent protection among developed countries are comparable to 
that of the U.S. Therefore, high level of patent level in a developed country does not 
motivate U.S. affiliates to invest more in that country. Second, food and kindred
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industry is affected more than chemical industry by IPR production. Actually, they 
expect the IPR protection to affect only the chemical industry. As an explanation to 
that result, they state that brands and trademarks may play an important role in food 
and kindred industry although it is considered as a patent insensitive industry. Third, 
environmental regulations do not affect U.S. outward FDI in the food and kindred 
industry (because the coefficient of lead content is not statistically significant) but 
they affect U.S. outward FDI in the chemical industry in the developed country 
regression as expected (since firms in this industry do not need to spend money for 
pollution equipment). Finally, in the developing country regression, FDI flows and 
environmental regulations are inversely related (the coefficient sign is negative).
Co et al. (2004) use both food and kindred and chemical and allied industries 
by distinguishing developed country from developing country. Their study is more 
comprehensive than Javorcik (2004) since she uses only technology intensive 
industries.
Ederington and Minier’s (2003) study is important because they emphasize 
that environmental issues should be considered in the framework of WTO and 
NAFTA. They have two main arguments supporting that environmental policy 
should be added to trade agreements. First, it is unfair for countries to gain 
comparative advantage through lax environmental regulations. Second, although it is 
optimal not to use environmental regulation as a trade barrier to protect domestic 
companies, it is not efficient for the world economy. Following these, they find that 
impact of environmental regulation affect trade flows.
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They point out that there is a correlation between environmental regulation 
and trade flows when environmental regulation is modeled as an endogenous 
variable. Previous studies find a small correlation between environmental regulation 
and trade flow because they use environmental regulation as an exogenous variable.
Previous studies test the hypothesis which is if the high level of environmental 
regulations create comparative disadvantage in some industries, then these industries 
have the highest import penetration. Ederington and Minier (2003) test this 
hypothesis using U.S. data for the manufacturing industry from 1978 to 1992. They 
estimate the models by using OLS, 2SLS, and 3SLS. The stringency of 
environmental regulation is measured by the ratio of pollution abatement costs to total 
costs of materials in an industry.
First they estimate the model using U.S. net imports as dependent variable. 
The independent variables are the level of environmental regulation, trade barriers, 
total trade (imports plus exports), human and physical capital intensity of each 
industry18, industry size (defined as the value of shipments), percentage of workers in 
the industry who are union members, and number of firms in the industry. This 
equation shows the effects of changes in environmental regulations on net imports.
In the second equation, they use environmental protection in an industry as 
dependent variable. The independent variables are net imports and tariffs. This 
equation shows the effect of changes in net imports on environmental regulations.
18 They use a method developed by Grossman and Krugman. (1994). The wages that are paid to 
unskilled labour (who has less than high school education) are calculated by taking the product o f the 
number o f workers in the industry and the average yearly income. Then, the remaining portion o f 
wage costs divided by value added for the industry in order to calculate human capital. In order to 
calculate the share o f physical capital in value added, the ratio o f wage costs to unskilled labour and 
human capital) are subtracted from one.
50
Then they estimate the net import equation and environmental regulation equation 
simultaneously. They treat both the level of import penetration and environmental 
regulations as endogenous variables because this provides them to isolate these two 
effects: the higher levels of import may result in the relaxation of environmental 
regulations and low level of environmental regulations in an industry results in high 
level of imports to that industry.
The coefficient estimate on environmental regulations is positive and also 
statistically significant in the U.S.net imports regression that are estimated by OLS, 
2SLS, and 3SLS. This result indicates that industries with high level of 
environmental regulations (high pollution equipment costs) tend to have higher levels 
of import because it is costly to produce in industries that face strict environmental 
regulations. However, the coefficient of the environmental regulation is 0.53 (OLS) 
which indicates that when environmental costs rise by 1 percentage point, the net 
import penetration increase by only 0.53 of a percentage point. The other coefficient 
estimates are as expected. They find negative coefficient on the tariff variable. This 
means that the higher the tariff within an industry, the lower the amount of 
environmental regulations. The coefficient on the concentration ratio is negative. 
This indicates that the more concentrated the industry, the stronger the lobby and 
therefore the lower the cost of regulation imposed on the industry. The main 
conclusion is that environmental regulations have little impact on net imports, and a 
minor source of comparative advantage
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The study of Ederington and Minier (2003) is different from Javorcik (2002) 
and Co et al. (2004) because Ederington and Minier (2003) modeled environmental 
regulations as endogenous variable.
Our study explores the role of labour market competitiveness in determining 
the flow of FDI which is quite different than Javorcik (2002), Ederington and Minier
(2003), and Co et al. (2004). According to Rahmah and Ishak (2003), there are 
several factors that determine labour market competitiveness. They state that the skill 
composition and the wage rate are the crucial factors that determine FDI inflows into 
host countries. They examine whether labour market competitiveness affects the 
inflows of FDI into Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. The reason why they 
choose these countries is that because they are following the first tier countries such 
as Taiwan and South Korea in order to have the status of newly industrialized 
countries. And also the technology level in Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines 
are low, so in some way they have to be competitive in other ways to get more inward 
FDI.
The Association Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)19 which includes 
Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines attracted FDI due to their cheap 
labour. However, recently countries such as Bangladesh, China and Vietnam have 
started to produce products cheaper than these southeast Asian nations. Therefore, 
they have to take extra steps to gain dynamic comparative advantage. The authors 
recommend these countries to improve their human resource by providing higher
19 The member countries are: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam (source: w w w .aseansec.org).
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education and professional training because growing industries such as information 
technology require skilled labour and to maintain low wages.
Rahmah and Ishak (2003) use the time period between 1985 and 1999 and 
estimate the model using OLS. The independent variables include manufacturing 
wage rates, number of work force, GDP, number of professional and technical 
workers, number of administrative and managerial workers, R&D expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP, average lending rate, and export plus imports to GDP.
The coefficient signs of manufacturing wage rates are positive for Malaysia 
and negative for Thailand and the Philippines. This indicates that Malaysia can still 
increase its wage rate without discouraging FDI. The coefficient sign of the number 
of labour force is not statistically significant for Malaysia and the Philippines, but it is 
statistically significant for Thailand with a positive sign. This indicates that when the 
size of the labour force is high, it attracts MNEs due to an increase in the labour 
market competitiveness which in turn creates low wages. The coefficient sign of 
GDP is positive for Malaysia and the Philippines (it is not statistically significant for 
Thailand). This indicates that FDI is attracted to high GDP countries with stables 
economies (because investors can forecast their future easily when the economy is 
stable), so Malaysia and the Philippines have to strengthen their economies in order to 
attract more FDI. The coefficient sign of the number of professional and technical 
workers has a significantly negative impact on FDI inflows (it is expected to have a 
positive influence) for Malaysia and Thailand (it is insignificant for the Philippines). 
The number of administrative and managerial workers in the Philippines has a
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positive but insignificant effect on the FDI inflows. This contradictory result can be 
explained as follows:
“An increase in the number of professional and technical workers 
reflects a greater ability by local firms to operate without reliance 
on foreign investors. As the rate o f savings is quite high in 
Malaysia, the country may have a capital surplus that can be 
mobilised if enough high level manpower exists. Also, when the 
number of professional and technical workers increases, the ability 
of foreign investors to hire expatriates may be limited, thus 
potentially impeding their investment”, (pp. 400)
They conclude that the level of economic development and openness of the 
economy play an important role in attracting the FDI, besides labour market 
competitiveness. The ASEAN-3 countries still rely on FDI as a source of capital and 
technology knowledge. Therefore, their labour market has to be more competitive. 
This competitiveness can come in the focus of educated labour force.
According to Braconier et al. (2002), most of the empirical research find that 
U.S. outward FDI follows a pattern consistent with horizontal FDI. Also, those 
studies emphasize that FDI is attracted to developed counties which are also skilled- 
labour abundant than to developing countries which are skilled-scarce. The limited 
empirical research on vertical FDI emphasizes the role of relative factor endowments 
in determining the scope of FDI. Different than most of the previous studies, I also 
analyze factor cost differences (wages) between home country and host countries.
In the following section, we present the model.
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4. Econometric Models and Data
4.1 Methodology and Expectations
In this study we use the gravity model. The gravity model approach to trade
comes from Newtonian physics. Newton's law of universal gravitation states the
following: Every object in the universe attracts every other object with a force
directed along the line of centers for the two objects that is proportional to the product
of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between the
two objects (Munisamy Gopinath and Rodrigo Echeverria, 2004; Leo A. Grunfeld,
2003). The equation is as follows:
G.mi m 2 (1)
F= -----------
d2
where G is the gravitational constant mi is the mass of the first object, m2 is the mass 
of the second object, and d is the distance between these two objects
The gravity equation first appeared in the empirical trade literature with the 
contributions of Jan Tinbergen (1962) and Pentti Poyhonen (1963) (Grunfeld, 2003). 
Since then, Newton’s law of gravity in the trade models has been used by many 
others such as De Molle and Paul Morsink (1991), Anton Dohm (1996), Chedor and 
Mucchielli (1998), Di Maura Brenton and Lucke (1999), Feenstra, Markusen and 
Rose (2001), and Edward Christie (2002). Edward Christie (2002) indicates the 
analogy for trade as follows:
“the trade flow between two countries is proportional to the 
product of each country's 'economic mass', generally measured by
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GDP, each to the power o f quantities to be determined, divided by 
the distance between the countries’ respective 'economic centers of 
gravity', generally their capitals, raised to the power of another 
quantity to be determined.” (p.l)
The ‘standard’ gravity model estimates bilateral trade between countries and 
explains trade as a function of their GDPs, populations, the distance between them, 
and additional factors such as sharing land border and common language.
This can be formulated in linear form as follows:
Ln(Mij) = a  + p Ln(Yi) + y  Ln(Yj) + 5 Ln(Dij) + ey (2)
where My is the imports between country i and j. Y is the GDP’s o f country i and j, 
Dy is the distance of between the countries’ capitals, and Gy is the error term.
Following their pioneering work, Linneman (1966) extended the gravity 
formulation to include population as an additional measure of the country size 
(Mohammad Mafizur Rahman, 2003).
This can be formulated in the linear form as follows:
Ln(My) = a + p Ln(Yj) + y Ln(Yj) + 6 Ln(Dy) + b Ln(Popj) + r| Ln(Popi) + 8y (3) 
where Popj is the population in country j and Popi is the population in country i.
Originally, Krugman (1980) incorporates FDI in the trade gravity model. 
Walid Hejazi and A. Edward Safarian (2002) group the determinants o f FDI as 1) 
gravity model for the determinants of foreign trade, focused on market size, transport 
costs, trade barriers, cultural distance and the exchange rate; 2) Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory which emphasizes differences in factor endowments; 3) variables that 
concentrate on the new trade theories such as openness to trade, openness to FDI,
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total expenditure on R&D relative to GDP, and secondary school enrolment rates; 4) 
policy variables such as membership of a union, 5) institutional variables such as 
country’s economic and political risk. In the literature we reviewed, Bognanno et al.
(2005) use the gravity model with dependent variable total sales of MNEs. They 
analyze how tariffs, wages, and industrial relations environments influenced U.S. 
MNEs’ production location decisions. They examine the operations of U.S. MNEs in 
seven manufacturing industry and twenty-two countries over the years 1982-91. The 
independent variables include the ratio of host country GDP to U.S GDP, the ratio of 
the hourly compensation rate of manufacturing production workers in host country to 
that in the U.S., foreign tariff rate and cultural openness. All the variables are in 
natural logarithm. These variables are determinants of trade but at the same time 
determinants of FDI.
Same as Bognanno et al (2005), Brainard (1997) use the gravity model in 
order to study the determinants of FDI. He uses freight and tariffs as trade costs, the 
absolute value of differential in per-worker GDP between the United States and the 
host country, and openness to trade which is based on survey data from World 
Competitiveness Report. All the variables are in natural logarithm. It is logical to 
use the gravity model approach to model FDI inflows. It is logical since the 
determinants of trade are a part of the FDI model; thus, we can use gravity model for 
the determinants of FDI. The use of natural logarithm gives rise to coefficients that 
pertain to the elasticities between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables which help us to identify the relative importance of the independent 
variables in each regression. For example, if the coefficient of host country’s GDP is
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smaller in the equation with the dependent variable export back to U.S. than the 
coefficient of the host country’s GDP in the equation with the dependent variable 
local sales, we can say that changes in host country’s GDP leads to larger effects on 
the model with the dependent variable local sales.
Appendix Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics with all variables in 
natural log. Since there are missing data, the sample sizes are different. In all the 
years, Canada has the maximum value of total sales which decreases from 
US$162917 million in 1999 to US$136636 million in 2001. The reasons are due to 
the following. First, Canada is a big country like the U.S. although Canada’s 
population (30,499 thousands) is not as high as the U.S.’s population. Second, 
Canada has high skilled labour ratio which is around 38 percent in each year. Third, 
Canada is an English-speaking country. Finally, it is very close to U.S. These 
indicate that host country size and skilled labour abundance play an important role in 
the location choice of U.S. MNEs.
Before we analyze our regression results, we state our model and expectations 
in accordance with the FDI theories reviewed previously.
Following the literature, we constructed our model as follows:
Salesjk = p0 + Pi LnGDPPCk + p2 LnDISTjk + p3 LnPOPk + p4 ENGk + p5 LnCOOPk + p6TAXk 
+  p7 SKILLk + p8 EDUCk + p9 LnWAGEk + P i0 LnINVCk + p i i LnTRADECk + ey (4)
where Salesjk denotes the home country j sales in host country k, GDPPC is the gross 
domestic product per capita in country k, POP is population in country k, DIST is the 
distance, ENG is the English-speaking, COOP is the cooperation between labour and 
employers, TAX is corporate income tax rate, SKILL is the skill ratio, EDUC is the
58
education, WAGE is the wage, INVC is the investment cost, and TRADEC is the 
trade cost.
After analyzing this regression, we exclude GDPPC from the model and 
include SKILL into the model.
20Our study covers a total of 32 countries . In our sample we have seven 
upper-middle-income economies, seventeen high-income OECD members, six lower- 
middle-income economies, and two high income economies. The countries are 
chosen on the basis o f data availability. The data are collected for the years 1999, 
2000, and 2001. All observations are annual. We take the U.S. outward FDI in the 
manufacturing sector in each country. The U.S. Department o f Commerce provides 
annual data on sales of foreign affiliates of U.S. parent firms. These are the most 
comprehensive data on the activities of U.S.-based MNEs and their foreign affiliates. 
We use a wide range of affiliate measures: exports back to U.S., local sales, exports 
to third countries, and total sales. Export back to U.S. is vertical FDI and local sales 
is horizontal FDI. We use them interchangeably in the following pages. In the 
literature we reviewed, some studies use only total sales and some studies use all four 
in order to support their expectations. We believe that we have to use all four as 
dependent variables so we estimate four regressions.
It is important to use all four dependent variables for two reasons. First, as 
we mentioned in the previous page, in order to compare the elasticities of a certain 
independent variable in each regressions. Second, for example, if the sign of the skill 
variable is positive in all regressions then we are in line with our expectations without
20 See appendix Table 2 for the countries that are in the sample.
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any contradiction. However, if  in one of the regressions the coefficient sign of the 
wage variable is different than the other ones, we cannot be sure whether our 
expectations are consistent with the model or not. For example, Carr et al. (2001) 
only use total sales as a FDI measure and they conclude that their model is consistent 
with the knowledge-capital model. However, we also need to see if they find 
negative coefficient sign on the wage variable using local sales of U.S. MNEs data. 
Braconier et al. (2002) use all four FDI measures in their model. They find the same 
coefficient signs for each variable in all models. Their model is consistent with 
vertical FDI theory so their focus is on the wage premium variable. They define the 
wage premium variable as the ratio of the skilled-to-unskilled wage in the host 
country, in relation to the same ratio in the home country. They find the coefficient 
sign of the wage variable negative in all regressions. Even though their model is 
consistent with the vertical FDI theory (which is not consistent with our 
expectations), at least their regressions are consistent with each other. The problem 
with their model is that they use only one country which is Sweden. By using only 
one country one cannot prove that their model is consistent with horizontal FDI 
theory, vertical FDI theory, or knowledge-capital theory.
GDP data are taken from the World Bank, World Development Indicators21. 
We obtain GDP per capita (GDPPC) by dividing current GDP to population. It is 
measured in billions US dollars. The distance (DIST) data is in miles from 
Washington DC to each country’s capital cities. Population (POP) data are from 
World Development Indicators and measured in thousands. The English speaking
21 Please refer to Data Appendix for the detailed description o f the variables.
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(ENG) is a dummy variable. If in a country English is speaking partly or totally it is 
equal to 1. Otherwise, it is equal to 0. The data are taken from the CIA World 
Factbook, 2003. The cooperation between labour and employers (COOP) is an index 
from 1 to 7, with a higher number indicating that labour and employers relations are 
generally cooperative. The data are taken from the World Economic Forum, World 
Competitiveness Report. The corporate income tax rate (TAX) is measured in 
percentage. The data are taken from the World Competitiveness Report.
Skill (SKILL) data are taken from International Labour Organization, and 
they are defined as the sum of occupational categories Group 1 (legislators, senior 
officials and managers), Group 2 (Professionals) and Group 3 (Technicians and 
associate professionals) in employment in each country, divided by total employment. 
In our model, first we use GDPPC, and then exclude GDPPC and include SKILL. 
The reason why we do that is to show that we have the same results. Net secondary 
school enrollment (EDUC) is defined as the ratio of the number of children of official 
secondary school age (as defined by the national education system) who are enrolled 
in secondary school to the population of the corresponding official school age. The 
data are from the World Bank, World Development Indicators and UNESCO Institute 
for statistics. Manufacturing wage (WAGE) data are taken from the International 
Labor Organization, and they are converted into hourly wages. Then, using nominal 
exchange rate they are converted into U.S. dollars. Investment cost (INVC) data are 
taken from the same source and it is an index from 1 to 7, with a higher number 
indicating higher investment cost. We construct investment cost variable from survey 
results of the World Economic Forum by taking the mean of five indices. The
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investment barriers include difficulties in acquiring local bank credit, restrictions on 
access to local and foreign capital markets, inadequate protection of intellectual 
property, strict controls on hiring and firing practices, and administrative burdens for 
start ups. Investment cost variable captures openness to FDI. Countries decide the 
limit of openness to foreign investments by controlling the investment barriers that 
they impose to foreign investors. Countries’ hidden import barriers data measure 
trade costs (TRADEC) and it is an index from 1 to 7, with seven indicating higher 
trade costs. The data are from World Competitiveness Report.
We first state our expectations in accordance with FDI theory and then we 
discuss our regression results. We have four dependent variables: export back to U.S. 
(vertical FDI), local sales (horizontal FDI), export to third country, and total sales. 
Thus, we state the expectations considering each dependent variable. All our 
expectations are summarized in Table 7.
Expectations
1. The GDP per capita (GDPPC) variable is used as a proxy for purchasing 
power of local consumers. The higher the purchasing power of local 
consumers, the higher the sales in the host country. We expect to have 
positive sign on the GDP per capita variable in all regressions.
2. Distance (DIST) variable captures the freight cost when exporting back to 
U.S. Distance variable are not included in the export to third countries 
regression because it is the distance between Washington D.C. and host 
country’s capital cities and trade cost is the trade cost of host country. 
Therefore, these variables do not have any effect on sales to third countries.
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Carr et al. (2001) state that it is unclear whether the distance variable captures 
trade costs or investment costs, since both should rise with distance. They 
find the distance variable as statistically insignificant. Considering vertical 
FDI model, since MNEs that engage in vertical FDI produce in host countries 
and export the commodities back to U.S., they expect short distance between 
U.S. and host countries and low rate of hidden barriers. Therefore, we expect 
to have a positive sign on the distance variable in local sales and total sales 
regressions and to have a negative sign in the export back to U.S. sales 
regression.
3. Population (POP) measured the size of the economy. A country’s population 
reflects market opportunities for MNEs to sell their products. Therefore, the 
bigger the market, the higher the scale o f sales in the host country. In the 
literature, studies also use GDP in place of population to measure the size of 
economy such as Markusen and Maskus (1999), Carr et al. (2001), and 
Bognanno (2005). They all conclude that the larger a country, the higher the 
affiliate sales all else equal. We expect to get positive coefficient in all 
regressions. Following Markusen and Markus (1999), we expect to get a 
larger coefficient in the horizontal FDI regression. They explain the reason as 
follows: “Growth will lead to a switch from high marginal-cost plant firms to 
high-flxed-cost multi-plant firms, increasing local sales more than in 
proportion to growth in incomes” pp. 11.
4. When in a country English (ENG) is spoken, communication is easier and 
decreases the cost of doing business in that host country. The literature we
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reviewed (i.e. Shatz 2004 and Bognanno et al. 2005) agree that English 
speaking makes the cost o f doing business low so has positive impact on FDI. 
Brainard (1997) states that a common language should lower the share of 
export to third countries if exporting requires less communication than 
running a local production facility. We expect to positive sign in all 
regressions. We also expect to get lower magnitude of the coefficient in the 
export back to U.S. and third countries.
5. Cooperation of worker and employer variable (COOP) captures the labour 
standards issue; so we expect the coefficient sign to be positive because U.S. 
MNEs tend to locate production in countries with high cooperation between 
labour and employers. When the relationship between labour and employers 
is good then U.S. MNEs run their businesses more smoothly since strike 
intensity is low. Therefore, MNEs have fewer stops in the production so in 
general cost of doing business is low. In the literature that we reviewed 
studies do not use COOP but very close to the COOP variable, Bognanno et 
al. (2005) use strike density. The strike density variable is measured by the 
number o f working days lost to strikes per employee. Their results imply that 
U.S. MNEs prefer to locate production in countries with low strike density.
6. When the corporate income tax rate (TAX) is high in a country, the cost of 
doing business increase which creates less incentive for MNEs to invest in 
that host country; so, the coefficient sign is expected to be negative in all 
regressions.
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7. The skilled labour (i.e. professional, administrative, and managerial workers) 
will help MNEs use high technology processes that generate higher levels of 
productivity. Therefore, we hypothesize that the ratio of skilled labour to total 
employment in a host country should have a positive impact on FDI. In the 
literature, studies that find the evidence of horizontal FDI find the coefficient 
sign of the skill difference term negative. Markusen and Maskus (1999) use 
the outward U.S. data from 1986 to 1994. They find a negative sign for the 
skill difference term. Since U.S. is a much larger country than any other 
country, a decrease in the host-country skilled-labour ratio increases the skill 
difference term. Then, U.S. affiliates in other countries shut down their plants 
due to insufficient skilled labour. Therefore, the local sales in the host 
countries and also sales to third countries by U.S. affiliates decrease. To sum 
up, we expect to find positive coefficient signs in all regressions.
8. Education (EDUC) indicates worker quality. When education level is high, 
human capital is high too all else equal. From the literature we reviewed only 
Shatz (2004) uses the education variable and he defines it as the average years 
of secondary education for the population age 15 and higher. He uses U.S. 
outward FDI data from 1986 to 1995 and finds that more horizontal FDI are 
associated with higher levels o f education. We also expect a positive sign on 
the education variable in all regressions.
9. High wages (WAGE) attract more FDI. According to Bognanno (2005) lower 
wages attracts more FDI is anomalous. He explains as follows: “The average 
wage rate in a country may be low, but a MNE uses a particular technology in
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its production process. This MNE needs skilled labour possibly with high 
wage”, (pp. 172) Brainard’s (1997) analysis focuses on a 1989 cross section of 
data disaggregated by industry and country. He uses the per worker income 
differential to control for factor proportions differences. He finds positive 
coefficient sign in the horizontal FDI model and negative sign in the vertical 
FDI model. Even though the coefficient sign of the per worker income 
differential is negative in the vertical FDI model, he states that it is has 
negligible effect on the export back to U.S. since the coefficient is smaller 
than the coefficient in the horizontal FDI model. We expect to get a positive 
sign on the wage variable in all regressions.
10. High investment costs (INVC) increase the cost of doing business in a 
country; so the coefficient sign of investment cost is expected to be negative. 
Shatz (2004) states that high investment cost has negative impact on FDI 
because high investment costs discourage MNEs due to increasing costs to 
establish plants in host countries. Carr et al. (2001) uses a simple average of 
several indices such as controls on hiring and firing practices, market 
dominance by a small number of enterprises, and difficulties in acquiring local 
bank credit. Carr et al. (2001) use bilateral FDI data with U.S. which is either 
the parent or the host country in every observation. They conclude that high 
investment cost is associated with less FDI. Markusen and Maskus (1999) 
find negative sign on investment cost in the regression with dependent 
variables local sales and export back to U.S. and third countries. They find a 
smaller coefficient in the local sales equation than that in the export to U.S.
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and third countries. This means that investments to serve the local market are 
less sensitive to investment costs than are investments to serve export markets 
because alternative locations may be selected for the latter. We expect to get 
negative coefficient in all regressions.
11. Trade cost (TRADEC) is considered as hidden economic barriers. According 
to Markusen and Markus (1999) higher trade costs should encourage firms to 
serve local markets via horizontal FDI. Shatz (2004) considers country 
characteristics in analyzing the types of FDI emphasizing on geography 
variables such as trade costs. According to him, trade cost is an important 
determinant of horizontal FDI model only if U.S. foreign affiliates use US 
inputs intensively because trade costs raise the costs of imported intermediate 
inputs. Considering vertical FDI model, since MNEs that engage in vertical 
FDI produce in host countries and export the commodities back to U.S., they 
expect low rate of hidden barriers between U.S. and host countries. We do 
not include trade cost variable to the export to third countries model, because 
this variable reflects the costs between the U.S. and host countries. We expect 
to get negative coefficient in the export back to U.S. regression, positive 
coefficient on the local sales and total sales regressions.
12. Overall, if we get positive coefficient on GDPPC, SKILL and POP, our results 
will be consistent with horizontal FDI theory. Therefore, U.S. MNEs invest in 
countries with similar size as U.S. and high skilled labour abundant. In order 
to decide whether our expectations are consistent with the theory, we will look 
at the significance level of the coefficients in the model with the dependent
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variable total sales. In the literature, Brainard (1997) and Markusen and 
Maskus (1999) find results consistent with horizontal FDI theory.
4.2 Regression Analysis
We start our regression analysis by estimating the basic gravity model (See 
equation 3). Using our data set, we estimate gravity models for the years 1999, 2000, 
and 2001. The dependent variables are total sales22, export back to U.S. (vertical 
FDI), local sales (horizontal FDI), and sales to third countries. The independent 
variables are GDPPC of the host country, POP, and DIST. We use GDPPC as a 
proxy for purchasing power of local consumers, population as a proxy for market 
size, and distance as a proxy for freight costs.
In table 8 we present the results. We use regression 1, regression 2, regression 
3, and regression 4 as short forms of the regressions with the dependent variable total 
sales 1 (See column 3), the regression with the dependent variable export back to U.S. 
which is vertical FDI (See column 4), the regression with the dependent variable 
locals sales which is horizontal FDI (See column 5), and finally the regression with 
the dependent variable export to third countries (See column 6) respectively. All 
variables are in natural log so we can see the elasticities between each dependent 
variable and independent variable. We explain only the year 1999 in detail because
9^the other years give similar results .
Considering the year 1999, all the regressions except the regression with the 
dependent variable export back to U.S. are statistically significant at the 1 percent
22 Total sales are the simple summation o f  export back to U.S., local sales, and sales to third countries.
23 Considering all three years, the R2,s are close to each other, and the sign and the size o f the 
coefficients are same.
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significance level. Therefore, considering regression 2, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the independent variables are jointly not significant, pi = P2 = p3 = 0. 
The regression does not have any explanatory power. Regression 3 has the highest R2 
which is 68 percent (See column 5 in Table 8). It indicates that 68 percent of the 
variation in local sales is explained by the independent variables. GDP per capita is 
used as a proxy for purchasing power of local consumers. We expect its sign to be 
positive in all the regressions. The coefficient sign of GDPPC is positive in all 
regressions. This result implies a positive strong relationship between the host 
country GDPPC and the sales of multinationals. The distance variable is not 
significant in any of the regressions. We add distance variable to the model as proxy 
for freight costs. We do not include distance variable to regression 4 since it is 
defined as the distance from Washington D.C to the host countries capital cities not 
the third countries’ capital cities. We use population variable as proxy for market 
size. Therefore, we expect the population sign to be positive because when the 
population is high in a country, MNEs expect more sales. We find the coefficient 
sign of POP negative in all the regressions; this clearly is an anomalous result. The 
literature we reviewed such as Carr et al. (2001), Blonigen et al. (2002), Markusen 
and Markus (1999), and Brainard (1997) find positive sign for the market size 
variable. Following Brainard (1997), we expect to get high elasticity of population in 
regression 3 than regression 2 and 4 since, the market size of the host country effects 
local sales stronger than export back to the U.S. However, we cannot compare the 
elasticities of independent variables because as mentioned earlier we obtain 
statistically insignificant vertical FDI model for all years (See Table 8 column 4).
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Table 8 near here
The basic gravity model is not enough to see whether our data supports our 
expectations or not. Therefore, we extend our model by adding more explanatory 
variables (See equation 4).
When we add all the variables in our model, we have severe multicollinearity 
problem. The correlation matrix does not indicate multicollinearity problem because 
the correlation coefficients are all smaller than 0.5 (See Table 6); however, when we 
put all the independent variables in the model, we obtain a R2 which is 99 percent. 
Thus, we need to check for multicollinearity by regressing each independent variable 
with the rest of the independent variables. If any of the R ’s are greater than the 
original R , then we conclude that there is no multicollinearity problem in the model. 
We present the multicollinearity test results in Table 9. For example, the R2 of the 
total sales regression is 0.59. When we regress GDPPC on the remaining 
independent variables (DIST, POP, ENG, COOP, TAX, SKILL, EDUC, WAGE, 
INVC, and TRADEC), we obtain R2=0.99 which is larger than 0.59. Then we 
exclude one of them from the model. Similarly, the SKILL variable and the GDPPC 
variables are highly correlated to each other. Since when we regress SKILL variable 
on the rest of the independent variables the R2 is 0.99 which is greater than 0.59. 
Therefore, we exclude the GDPPC variable from the model and add the SKILL 
variable. Therefore, GDPPC, WAGE, and SKILL are same. EDUC and SKILL, 
INVC and TAX, TRADEC and DIST are correlated. Therefore, we include GDPPC 
as a proxy for relative factor costs, TAX as a proxy for investment cost, and DIST as 
a proxy for TRADEC. We also use COOP to capture the effects o f labour standards.
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Finally we end up with the independent variables: GDPPC, POP, DIST, ENG, COOP, 
and TAX. All the variables are in natural logs except ENG and TAX. English 
speaking is a dummy variable which is defined as if  in a country English is speaking 
than it is equal to 1 otherwise it is 0. The TAX is measured as rate so by looking at 
the coefficients we can say, for example, when there is 1 percentage point increase in 
the independent variable increases the dependent variable by 1.2 percentage point, all 
else equal. Therefore, we do not need to take the natural log o f ratio variables.
Table 9 near here
This leads us to our preferred specification. The results appear in Table 10. 
Same as in the basic gravity model, we find the coefficient sign of POP negative in all 
regressions, this is clearly is an anomalous result. The sign o f GDPPC is positive in 
all regressions which is consistent with our expectations and previous literature. 
Same as the basic gravity model, the regressions with the dependent variable export 
back to U.S. is not statistically significant. We extend our basic gravity model by 
adding ENG, COOP and TAX to the model. However, these variables are not 
statistically significant in any o f the regressions in any year. Only the ENG variable 
is statistically significant in regression 1 (See Table 10, column 3 and 5) and 
regression 3 in 2001. This result is consistent with our expectations and prior studies. 
When English is spoken in a country, MNEs tend to invest more in that country 
because communication gets easier. In the literature, Shatz (2004) finds the English 
language coefficients strongly positive and significant in all the regressions.
Table 10 near here
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We build confidence interval of the regression coefficient for the year 1999 
(See Table 11). Based on t-tests, the confidence interval is the plus/minus range 
around the observed sample regression coefficient. We build coefficient intervals for 
GDPPC, POP, COOP, and TAX. For example, the confidence interval for the 
GDPPC coefficient in the regression with dependent variable export back to U.S. 
(0.24, 0.47) and in the regression with the dependent variable local sales is (0.73, 
1.53). Since the confidence intervals are overlapping, we reject the null hypothesis 
which is H o  P vertical, gdppc P horizontal, gdppc■ Therefore, the GDPPC coefficients are 
different in vertical FDI and horizontal FDI regressions. We reject the null 
hypothesis for all variables.
Table 11 near here
We replace GDPPC with SKILL. Considering the year 1999, all the 
regressions are statistically significant including regression 2 (See Table 12 column 
4). The R ’s of all the regressions are similar to the model with GDPPC as 
independent variable. In the previous models, vertical FDI regressions are not 
statistically significant. With this model we have statistically significant vertical FDI 
regression which helps us to come to a conclusion. The SKILL variable is 
significant even at 1 percent level in all regressions and has positive sign which 
indicates that U.S. MNEs tend to invest more in high skilled labour abundant 
countries. The coefficient values of SKILL are above 4 percent point which indicates 
that when host countries skill labour abundance increases by 1 percent point, the 
investment of U.S. FDI in those countries increases by 4 percent point all others are 
equal. Viewed another way, 4 percentage point corresponds to a skill elasticity of
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demand for labour. Considering 2000 and 2001, we can conclude that the SKILL 
variable has stronger impact on export back to U.S. The magnitude of the coefficient 
in the export back to U.S (3.34) is higher than that in the local sales (2.95).
The distance variable is significant only in regressions 1 and 3 and only in 
1999 (See Table 12, column 3 and 4). However, it does not have the expected sign. 
The coefficients are 1.48 and -1.56. We expect that high trade costs (which includes 
freight and insurance) encourages horizontal FDI and discourages vertical FDI. In 
the previous models, the coefficient signs of POP are negative, which is clearly an 
anomalous result. The anomalous POP effects are no longer present in this model. 
POP has positive sign and strongly significant. Host country size is a key 
determinant of FDI location. However, we cannot conclude that the market size 
effect is stronger on local sales. The magnitude of the coefficient in the local sales 
regression (1.23) is smaller than that in the export back to U.S. regression (2.14). The 
English variable has the expected sign and statistically significant only in year 1999. 
It is consistent with our expectations and the literature review. Common language 
reduces the costs and risk of investment (Shatz, 2004 and Bognanno et al., 2005). 
One of our key variables, COOP is used as proxy for labour standards. The estimates 
imply that U.S. MNEs prefer to locate production in countries that have good 
relationships between labour and employers so where labour standards are high.
Considering 2000 we obtain the same results. However, in 2001 our 
regressions are not statistically significant except the horizontal FDI regression. 
Therefore, we can conclude that U.S. MNEs engage in horizontal FDI rather than 
vertical FDI. U.S. MNEs engage in FDI in order to access market. In our sample we
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have 36 countries and 13 of them are higher-middle-income and lower-middle- 
income countries (See Table 2). Even though, we have 13 developing countries, our 
data indicates that FDI is done countries with similar size as U.S. and similar factor 
endowments.
Table 12 near here
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications
We have examined the production location decision of U.S. MNEs, using 
BEA manufacturing data on U.S. MNE operations in 32 countries in the years 1999, 
2000, and 2001. We have two main conclusions.
First, we find evidence that the cooperation of labour and employers variable 
has statistically significant effects on U.S. MNEs’ production location decisions. 
U.S. MNEs prefer to locate production in host countries where labour and employers 
are highly cooperative. When the relationship between labour and employer is good 
then U.S. MNEs run their businesses more smoothly since strike intensity is low. 
Therefore, MNEs have fewer stops in production so in general cost of doing business 
is low.
Second, we conclude that U.S. MNEs prefer to invest in skilled labour 
abundant countries because productivity increases with skilled labour. Therefore, 
U.S. MNEs prefer to invest in high productive countries.
There are some limitations in our study. First, we do not consider corruption 
which may be important. In the literature, some studies point out that U.S. MNEs are
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sensitive to host country corruption. Second, we use corporate income tax data that 
domestic firms pay to their governments. However, some governments may reduce 
the corporate income tax rate in order to attract more FDI. For example, China 
currently has two enterprise income tax regimes: one for domestic enterprises and the 
other for foreign companies. Although the nominal enterprise tax rate is the same 
33% (30% national, 3% local) for both domestic enterprises and MNEs, MNEs 
essentially enjoy much lower rates (ranging from 13% to 17%) due to various tax 
preferences. One of these tax preferences include: MNEs established in coastal cities 
have 24 percent corporate income tax rate whereas MNEs established in special 
economic zones have 15 percent corporate income tax rate. Moreover, the corporate 
income tax rates we use are the statutory rates (China Practice Newsletter, October 
2004).
We explained how labour standards affect FDI. Since the WTO rejects to 
include labour standards within the its framework, ILO should strengthen its 
enforcement function on its member countries. Member countries should agree on 
the policies to decrease poverty and increase economic development in order to 
strengthen labour standards in developing countries.
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Table 1. Dominant Production Regime and Country Characteristics
Regime Hypothesis Characteristics
(1) firm-level economies of scale are large,
Horizontal (2) plant level economies of scale are low,
multinationals (3) countries are large,
(4) trade costs are moderately high,
(5) countries are similar in their relative 
factor endowments,
(6) countries are similar in size.
Vertical (1) trade costs are moderately low,
multinationals (2) countries differ significantly in their 
relative factor endowments.
(1) trade costs are low and countries are
National similar in their relativefactor
exporting firms endowments and size,
(2) trade costs are moderate and countries 
are very different in size.
(Source: Markusen et al. 1996; Markusen and Anthony J. Venables 1996)
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Table 2. The Ten Largest FDI Recipients
(Million Dollar)
2000 2001
1 USA 301 159
2 UK 117 54
3 France 43 53
4 Holland 53 51
5 Belgium 246 51
6 China 41 47
7 Germany 195 32
8 Canada 67 28
9 Mexico 14 25
10 Hong Kong 62 63
TOTAL 809 323
(Source: World Investment Report 2002, pp. 303-306)
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Table 3. The Ten Largest Countries that the Sources of FDI Outflows
(Million Dollar)
2000 2001
1 USA 164 114
2 France 176 83
3 Belgium 242 67
4 Holland 71 44
5 Germany 50 43
6 UK 254 40
7 Japan 32 38
8 Canada 48 36
9 Spain 55 28
10 Italy 12 23
TOTAL 968 365
(Source: World Investment Report 2002, pp. 308-309)
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Table 4. Countries in the Model
High-income OECD members
Australia
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea, Republic of
Netherlands
New Zealand
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
High-income economies
Hong Kong 
Singapore
Upper-middle-income economies
Argentina
Chile
Czech Republic
Hungary
Malaysia
Mexico
Poland
Lower-middle-income economies
Brazil
China
Indonesia
Philippines
Russia
Thailand
(Source: World Bank)
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics
1999 TOTAL EXPORT
Mean 45241.5 8576.692
Median 35590 1583
Maximum 162917 69305
Minimum 2148 63
Std. Dev. 49812.2 19113.85
Observations 32 29
LOCSALES THIRD GDPPC
27263.85 9400.769 8.4E+11
21440 4353 4.8E+11
89259 43987 4.5E+12
993 696 5.7E+10
29532.61 12833.68 1.2E+12
30 28 32
DIST POP COOP TAX SKILL
Mean 4908.77 53481 5.020769 31.53846 0.28108
Median 4315 38658 5.21 34 0.29484
Maximum 9908 168027 6.09 45 0.38291
Minimum 1882 3762 3.93 1 0 0.08258
Std. Dev. 1987.2 51545.08 0.654885 9.56439 0.09388
Observations 32 32 32 32 26
EDUC WAGE INVC TRADEC
Mean 83.2308 8.454718 4.6 5.270769
Median 87 7.726525 4.7 5.38
Maximum 99 25.41512 5.5 6.58
Minimum 56 0.258988 3.8 3.86
Std. Dev. 12.4977 7.555875 0.574456 0.888908
Observations 29 26 32 32
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Correlation Coefficients
1999 TOTAL EXPORT LOCSALES THIRD GDPPC
TOTAL 1 . 0 0 . 8 1 . 0 0.5 0.3
EXPORT 0 . 8 1 . 0 0.7 0 . 0 -0 . 1
LOCSALES 1 . 0 0.7 1 . 0 0.5 0.4
THIRD 0.5 0 . 0 0.5 1 . 0 0 . 2
GDPPC 0.3 -0 . 1 0.4 0 . 2 1 . 0
DIST 0 . 0 -0 . 1 0 . 0 0 . 1 -0 . 1
POP 0 . 2 0 . 0 0.4 0 . 0 0 . 6
ENG 0 . 0 0.3 -0 . 1 -0 . 1 -0.4
COOP 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0.4
TAX 0.4 0 . 2 0 . 6 0 . 0 0.4
SKILL 0 . 2 0 . 2 0 . 1 0.3 -0.3
EDUC 0 . 1 0 . 0 0 . 1 0 . 0 0.4
WAGE 0 . 2 -0.3 0.3 0.7 0 . 6
IN VC 0 . 2 0.3 0 . 1 0 . 1 -0 . 1
TRADEC 0 . 0 0 . 2 -0 . 1 0 . 1 -0.5
DIST POP ENG COOP TAX
TOTAL 0 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 0 0 . 0 0.4
EXPORT -0 . 1 0 . 0 0.3 0 . 0 0 . 2
LOCSALES 0 . 0 0.4 -0 . 1 0 . 0 0 . 6
THIRD 0 . 1 0 . 0 -0 . 1 0 . 0 0 . 0
GDPPC -0 . 1 0 . 6 -0.4 0.4 0.4
DIST 1 . 0 -0 . 1 0.3 0 . 1 0.3
POP -0 . 1 1 . 0 -0 . 2 -0 . 1 0.3
ENG 0.3 -0 . 2 1 . 0 0 . 1 -0 . 6
COOP 0 . 1 -0 . 1 0 . 1 1 . 0 -0 . 2
TAX 0.3 0.3 -0 . 6 -0 . 2 1 . 0
SKILL 0 . 2 -0 . 8 0 . 1 0 . 0 0 . 1
EDUC -0 . 1 -0.3 -0 . 2 0 . 1 0.3
WAGE 0 . 1 0 . 1 -0.5 0.3 0.3
IN VC -0 . 1 -0 . 6 0 . 2 0.5 -0 . 2
TRADEC -0 . 1 -0 . 8 0 . 2 0.3 -0.3
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Correlation Coefficients (cont.)
SKILL EDUC
TOTAL 0 . 2 0 . 1
EXPORT 0 . 2 0 . 0
LOCSALES 0 . 1 0 . 1
THIRD 0.3 0 . 0
GDPPC -0.3 0.4
DIST 0 . 2 -0 . 1
POP -0 . 8 -0.3
ENG 0 . 1 -0 . 2
COOP 0 . 0 0 . 1
TAX 0 . 1 0.3
SKILL 1 . 0 0 . 6
EDUC 0 . 6 1 . 0
WAGE 0 . 2 0.4
IN VC 0.7 0 . 6
TRADEC 0.7 0 . 2
WAGE IN VC TRADEC
0 . 2 0 . 2 0 . 0
-0.3 0.3 0 . 2
0.3 0 . 1 -0 . 1
0.7 0 . 1 0 . 1
0 . 6 -0 . 1 -0.5
0 . 1 -0 . 1 -0 . 1
0 . 1 -0 . 6 -0 . 8
-0.5 0 . 2 0 . 2
0.3 0.5 0.3
0.3 -0 . 2 -0.3
0 . 2 0.7 0.7
0.4 0 . 6 0 . 2
1 . 0 0 . 1 0 . 1
0 . 1 1 . 0 0.7
0 . 1 0.7 1 . 0
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Table 8: Basic Gravity Model
Year Variable TOTSALES VERTICAL HORIZONTAL EXPTHIRD
1999 Constant -5.582588 -3.592348 -7.912467 -3.520062
(-2.041)** (-0.664) (-3.483)* (-1.636)
GDPPC 1.046551 0.671399 1.138821 0.891522
(5.430)* (1.807)*** (6.999)* (3.873)*
DIST 0.097902 -0.032774 0.149613
-0.208 (-0.034) -0.3717
POP -0.347368 -0.124977 -0.235396 -0.411978
(-2.179)** (-0.402) (-1.782)*** (-2 .1 2 1 )**
Obs. 32 29 30 28
Rsquare 0.53 0.14 0 . 6 8 0.38
Adj. Rsquare 0.48 0.04 0.65 0.33
F-stat 10.585* 1.402 18.682* 7.512*
2000 Constant -5.403984 -7.938073 -8.250148 -3.545717
(-2 .0 1 1 ) (-1.614) (-3.841)* (-1.443)
GDPPC 1.087868 0.902779 1.182289 1.021248
(5.569)* (2.296)** (7.568)* (3.486)*
DIST 0.014196 0.689062 0.128595
-0.03 -0.787 -0.347
POP -0.389199 -0.245015 -0.249721 -0.607098
(-2.404)** (-0.708) (-1.930) (-2.419)**
Obs. 32 29 32 30
Rsquare 0.55 0 . 2 2 0.71 0.31
Adj. Rsquare 0.5 0.13 0 . 6 8 0.26
F-stat 11.277* 2.404 23.341* 6.075*
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Table 8: Basic Gravity Model (cont. )
2001 Constant -5.61517 -5.344157 -8.232059 -2.772713
(-2.151)** (-1.103) (-4.042)* (-1.244)
GDPPC 1.032051 0.845471 1.124077 0.902247
(5.401)* (2.436)** (7.540)** (3.723)*
DIST 0.097151 0.229837 0.146407
-0.217 -0.27 -0.419
POP -0.315247 -0.279495 -0.170898 -0.523501
(-2.005)*** (-0.957) (-1.393) (-2.591)**
Obs. 32 31 32 32
Rsquare 0.54 0.19 0.73 0.33
Adj. Rsquare 0.49 0 . 1 0.7 0.28
F-stat 10.848* 2.134 24.714* 7.034*
Note: *, **, *** indicate the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent level, respectively. T-statistics are in parenthesis.
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Table 9. Multicollinearity Test
1. Total Sales
Original R2 = 0.590775
When GDPPC is the dependent variable, R2 =0.43 
When DIST is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.08 
When POP is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.44 
When ENG is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.14 
When COOP is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.27 
When TAX is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.31 
When SKILL is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.99 
When EDUC is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.98 
When WAGE is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.99 
When INVC is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.98 
When TRADEC is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.98
2. Vertical FDI
Original R2 = 0.305149
When GDPPC is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.43 
When DIST is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.08 
When POP is the dependent variable, R2 =0.30 
When ENG is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.15 
When COOP is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.27 
When TAX is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.31 
When SKILL is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.99 
When EDUC is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.99 
When WAGE is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.96 
When INVC is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.98 
When TRADEC is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.97
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Table 9. Multicollinearity Test (cont.)
3. Horizontal FDI
Original R2 = 0.722434
When GDPPC is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.43 
When DIST is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.08 
When POP is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.44 
When ENG is the dependent variable, R2 — 0.14 
When COOP is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.27 
When TAX is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.31 
When SKILL is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.99 
When EDUC is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.98 
When WAGE is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.99 
When INVC is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.98 
When TRADEC is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.98
4. Export to Third Country
Original R2 = 0.436781
When GDPPC is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.40 
When POP is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.40 
When ENG is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.29 
When COOP is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.26 
When TAX is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.29 
When SKILL is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.96 
When EDUC is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.98 
When WAGE is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.98 
When ENVC is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.96 
When TRADEC is the dependent variable, R2 = 0.98
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Table 10. Expanded Gravity Model
Year Variable TOTSALES VERTICAL HORIZONTAL EXPTHIRD
1999 Constant -6.712666 -7.695361 -7.849329 -3.266024
(-2.272)** (-1.363) (-3.132)* (-1.136)
GDPPC 1.157427 0.988655 1.218354 1.014995
(5.671)* (2.502)** (7.073)* (4.060)*
DIST 0.109967 -0.061305 0.097034
(0.232) (-0.065) (0.233)
POP -0.341256 -0.060824 -0.289947 -0.438033
(-1.962)*** (-0.190) ( - 1  9 9 7 )*** (-2.081)**
ENG 0.266765 0.435157 0.245503 0.078174
(1.594) (1.371) (1.591) (0.347)
COOP -0.156337 1.086077 -0.833749 -1.192185
(-0.117) (0.448) (-0.693) (-0.698)
TAX -0.007391 -0.027541 0.003011 -0.020934
(-0.587) (-1.193) (0.248) (-1.242)
Obs. 32 29 30 28
Rsquare 0.59 0.31 0.72 0.44
Adj .Rsquare 0.49 0 . 1 2 0.65 0.31
F-stat 6.015* 1.610 9.977* 3.412**
2 0 0 0 Constant -6.669464 -12.20423 -8.467760 -6.00538
(-2.429)** (-2.801)* (-3.782)* (-2.029)**
GDPPC 1.288609 1.307322 1.323148 1.235790
(6.246)* (3.650)* (7.866)* (3.925)*
DIST -0.059949 0.401318 0.118837
(-0.136) (0.548) (0.330)
POP -0.370427 -0.032784 -0.310345 -0.508032
(-2.065)** (-0.103) (-2 .1 2 2 )* (-1.843)
ENG 0.211283 0 . 2 1 1 1 2 2 0.230255 0.138195
(1.320) (0.828) (1.765) (0.600)
COOP -0.669374 0.734127 -1.193138 -0.057338
(-0.500) (0.363) (-1.094) (-0.031)
TAX -0.016968 -0.047821 -0.005906 -0.024248
(-1.682) (-3.095)* (-0.718) (-1.728)
Obs. 32 29 32 30
Rsquare 0.64 0.48 0.76 0.42
Adj .Rsquare 0.55 0.40 0.71 0.30
F-stat 7.362* 1.403 13.414* 3.505**
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Table 10. Expanded Gravity Model (cont. )
Constant -6.613627 -8.085715 -8.550826 -4.054764
(-2.336)** (-1.552) (-3.990)** (-1.447)
GDPPC 1.109886 0.932323 1.189235 0.968830
(4.877)* (2.216)** (6.903)* (3.251)*
DIST 0.061993 0.070203 0.125678
(0.137) (0.082) (0.368)
POP -0.314320 -0.166369 -0.205331 -0.502675
(-1.741) (-0.491) (-1.502) (-2.105)**
ENG 0.269594 0.344977 0.248807 0.205965
(1.717)*** (1.183) (2.094)** (0.980)
COOP 0.144608 2.068340 -0.418495 0.449049
(0.127) ( 1 .0 0 0 ) (-0.487) (0.296)
TAX 0.000508 -0.002306 0.002750 -0 . 0 0 1 0 2 0
(0.045) (-0 .1 1 2 ) (0.325) (-0.068)
Obs. 32 31 32 32
Rsquare 0.59 0.28 0.77 0.35
Adj.Rsquare 0.49 0 . 1 0 0.71 0.23
F-stat 5.930* 1.525 13.935* 2.857**
Note: *, **, *** indicate the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5percent, and 
lOpercent level, respectively. T-statistics are in parenthesis.
Table 11. Confidence Intervals
1999 Confidence Interval
EXPORT
GDPPC (0.24, 0.47)
POP (0.67, 0.89)
COOP (0.56, 0.86)
TAX (0.46, 0.77)
LOCSALES
GDPPC (0.73, 1.53)
POP (0.09, 0.56)
COOP (0.25, 0.60)
TAX (0.35, 0.65)
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Table 12. Gravity Model with the SKILL variable
Year Variable TOTSALES VERTICAL HORIZONTAL EXPTHIRD
1999 Constant -4.084958 -9.821045 -5.360257 -7.153668
(1.421) (1.842)** (1.841)** (2.703)*
SKILL 4.155194 4.113881 4.534295 4.064762
(3.931)* (2.094)* (4.330)* (4.086)*
DIST -1.47948 -1.071546 -1.556984
(-2.695)** (-1.096) (-2.634)**
POP 1.253202 1.653865 1.338242 1.24972
(4.576)* (3.274)* (4.984)* (4.655)*
ENG 0.44479 0.676358 0.446719 0 . 1 1
(2.496)** (2.196)** (2.207)** (0.565)
COOP 5.230821 6.507935 5.213162 2.682044
(3.183)* (2.378)** (2.854)* (1.567)
TAX -0.017963 -0.045213 -0.000216 -0.048733
(-1.234) (-1.793)* (-0.013) (-3.020)
Obs. 26 23 24 2 2
Rsquare 0.62 0.52 0 . 6 6 0.62
Adj .Rsquare 0.50 0.34 0.54 0.51
F-stat 5.129* 2.908** 5.506* 5.319*
2000 Constant -4.377075 -12.33364 -5.068129 -5.836073
(-1.300) (-2.793)** (-1.550) (-1.478)
SKILL 2.80484 3.336445 2.955551 2.032946
(2.478)** (2.245)** (2 .6 8 8 )** (0.168)
DIST -1.130496 -0.867106 -0.917534
(-1.788)* (-1.077) (-1.494)
POP 1.269222 2.142633 1.237662 0.801619
(3.606)* (4.690)* (3.620)* (0.072)
ENG 0.288913 0.334595 0.267673 0.255804
(1.348) (1.229) (1.286) (0.372)
COOP 4.46722 5.570285 3.470593 4.887352
(2.284)** (2.283)** (1.826) (0.060)
TAX -0.022372 -0.068152 -0.006793 -0.020071
(-1.524) (-3.724)** (-0.476) (0.273)
Obs. 27 25 27 26
Rsquare 0.45 0.60 0.50 0.30
Adj .Rsquare 0.29 0.46 0.35 0 . 1 2
F-stat 2.769** 4.432* 3.308* 1.676
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Table 12. Gravity Model with the SKILL variable (cont. )
Constant -1.459996 -6.446211 -2.991839 -1.570829
(-0.465) (-1.279) (-1.061) (-0.512)
SKILL 1.946771 2.608005 1.775129 1.958251
(1.129) (0.974) (1.146) (1.108)
DIST -0.63178 -0.111062 -0.606958
(-0.938) (-0.109) (-1.003)
POP 0.72892 0.935164 0.896685 0.385556
(2.300)** (1.853)*** (3.149)* (1.142)
ENG 0.244068 0.330075 0.216669 0.211718
(1.170) (1.069) (1.156) (0.898)
COOP 2.405278 3.189118 2.130743 2.227965
(1.289) (1.142) (1.271) (1.055)
TAX 0.008143 -0.002715 0.013232 0.004028
(0.469) (-0.105) (0.848) (0.216)
Obs. 28 27 28 28
Rsquare 0.34 0.24 0.49 0.19
Adj.Rsquare 0.15 0 . 0 1 0.34 0 . 0 1
F-stat 1.781 1.065 3.353* 1.052
Note: *, **, *** indicate the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent level, respectively. T-statistics are in parenthesis.
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Figure 1. FDI Inflows, Global and by Group of Countries, 1987-2003
(millions of US dollars, current prices)
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Figure 2. FDI Inflows
(millions of US dollars, current prices)
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Figure 3. FDI Outflows
(millions of US dollars, current prices)
1200000
1000000 -
800000-
600000-
400000-
200000 -
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02
--------WORLD ------- DEVELOPING
-------  DEVELOPED ------- USA
(Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Foreign Direct
Investment Database)
Figure 4. U.S. FDI Outflows
(millions o f US dollars, current prices)
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Figure 5. Regions of FDI in the Knowledge-Capital model
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Vertical and horizontal axes represent a country’s endowments o f skilled and 
unskilled labour, respectively. The origin of the home country is in South-West 
(Ohome) while the origin of the host country is in the Nort-East (Ohost)- Vertical F D I  is 
found in the North-West, where relative factor endowments and country sizes are 
different while horizontal F D I  is found in the middle, where relative factor 
endowments and country sizes are similar. On the North-West comer the host 
country has more unskilled labour than the home country.
(Source: Braconier, 2002; Carr et al. 2001).
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Data Appendix
The dependent variables are export to home country, local sales, export to 
third countries and total sales.
• EXPHOME is the export to the US (home country) by US affiliates in other 
countries from 1999 to 2001.
• LOCSALES is the local sales by US affiliates from 1999 to 2001.
• EXPTHIRD is the export to third countries by US affiliates from 1999 to
2001.
• TOTSALES is the total sales by US affiliates from 1999 to 2001. This data
are the sum of export to home countries, local sales and export to third
countries.
The data are measured in millions of dollars. These data are from the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce. The data are available at 
http://www.bea. doc, go v/bea/ai/iidguide.htm#page3. The data are placed under the 
Operations of U.S. affiliates of foreign companies.
The independent variables are GDP per capita, distance, population, English 
speaking ability, cooperation between labour and employers, corporate income tax 
rate, skill, net secondary school enrollment ratio, manufacturing wages, investment 
cost, and trade cost.
• GDPPC is the gross domestic product per capita. It is obtained by dividing 
current GDP to population. It is measured in billions o f US dollars. The GDP 
data are from the World Bank, World Development Indicators. The data are 
available at http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query.
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• DIST is the distance in miles from Washington DC to each country’s capital 
cities. These data are available at www.indo.com/distance/.
• POP is the total population in each country from 1999 to 2001. The unit is in 
thousands. The data are from the World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
The data are available at http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-querv/
• ENG is the English speaking. It is a dummy variable. If in a country English 
is speaking partly or totally it is equal to 1. Otherwise, it is equal to 0. The 
data are taken from the CIA World Factbook, 2003. These data are available 
athttp ://www.bartlebv. com/151 /fields/37.html
• COOP is the relationship between labour and employers. It is an index from 
1 to 7, with a higher number indicating that labour and employers relations are 
generally cooperative. The data are taken from the World Economic Forum; 
World Competitiveness Report: 2001-2002, 2000, and 1999.
•  TAX is the corporate income tax rate in each country from 1999 to 2001. The 
data are measured in percentage. The data are taken from the World Economic 
Forum; World Competitiveness Report: 2001-2002, 2000, and 1999.
• SKILL is the skilled labour abundance in the countries from 1999 to 2001. It 
is defined as the sum of occupational categories Group 1 (legislators, senior 
officials and managers), Group 2 (Professionals) and Group 3 (Technicians 
and associate professionals) in employment in each country, divided by total 
employment. The division of occupations data are from the International 
Labor Organization, and the total employment data are form the World Bank.
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The data are available at http://laborsta.ilo.org/_______ and
http:// devdata.worldbank.org/data-querv/.
• EDU is the net secondary school enrollment ratio in each country from 1999 
to 2001. It is defined as the ratio of the number of children of official 
secondary school age (as defined by the national education system) who are 
enrolled in secondary school to the population of the corresponding official 
school age. The data are from the World Bank, World Development 
Indicators and UNESCO Institute for statistics. The data are available at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query,
http://www.uis.unesco.org/TEMPLATE/html/Exceltables/education/gemer se 
condary.xs
• WAGE is the manufacturing wage rate in the affiliate country from 1999 to 
2001.
The data are converted to hourly manufacturing wage rate by considering the 
working hours in each country are 40 hours in a week, so eight hours in a 
day. Then, the manufacturing wage rates are converted to US dollars by 
using nominal exchange rates. The manufacturing wage data are from the 
International Labor Organization, and the nominal exchange rates are from 
University of British Colombia, Sauder School of Business; Pacific Exchange 
Rate Services. The monthly exchange rate data are converted to yearly by 
taking the mean. The data are available at http://laborsta.ilo.org/ and 
http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/data.html.
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• INVC is the cost of investing in the affiliate country from 1999 to 2001. It is 
a simple average of several indices as access to credit, access to foreign 
capital markets, administrative burden for start-ups, hiring and firing practices 
and intellectual property protection. The resulting indices are computed on a 
scale from 1 to 7, with a higher number indicating higher investment cost. The 
data are taken from the World Economic Forum; World Competitiveness 
Report: 2001-2002, 2000, and 1999.
• TRADEC is the cost of trading with the host countries from 1999 to 2001. It 
is defined as a measure of hidden import barriers (other than published tariffs 
and quotes). It is an index from 1 to 7, with a higher number indicating higher 
trade cost. The data are taken from the World Economic Forum; World 
Competitiveness Report: 2001-2002, 2000, and 1999.
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